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PRECEDENT  AND  PRECLUSION
Alan M. Trammell*
Preclusion rules prevent parties from revisiting matters that they have already litigated.  A
corollary of that principle is that preclusion usually does not apply to nonparties, who have not
yet benefited from their own “day in court.”  But precedent works the other way around.  Binding
precedent applies to litigants in a future case, even those who never had an opportunity to
participate in the precedent-creating lawsuit.  The doctrines once operated in distinct spheres, but
today they often govern the same questions and apply under the same circumstances, yet to
achieve opposite ends.  Why, then, does due process promise someone a “day in court” before she is
bound by preclusion but not when she is bound—regarding the exact same matter—through
precedent?
The doctrinal tension exposes a deeper and unresolved theoretical conundrum that cuts to
the heart of what due process protects.  This Article argues that two coherent, but distinct, visions
of due process underpin the doctrines.  Preclusion is rooted in a participation-oriented theory that
values participation as an inherent good, whereas precedent reflects an outcome-oriented theory
that emphasizes accuracy and reliance interests.  This Article argues that the outcome-oriented
theory is already the dominant approach in most areas of civil procedure and outside of the
litigation context.  Moreover, it is a normatively superior approach that holds the potential to
resolve enduring problems of serial litigation in which real parties in interest have multiple
opportunities to litigate the same matter.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine a scenario in which, in the long run, plaintiffs can never lose
and defendants can never win.  Most people probably would assume that this
Kafkaesque hypothetical must violate basic norms of due process.  But it is
precisely in the name of due process that such a scenario arises.
Consider a relatively recent case, Taylor v. Sturgell,1 in which one plaintiff
made a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for documents related
to a vintage aircraft, but the government denied the request based on a FOIA
exemption that protects trade secrets.  The plaintiff appealed that denial in
federal court but lost at every stage.2  A second plaintiff then requested the
exact same documents.  The government, yet again as the defendant, sought
to argue that preclusion prevented the second plaintiff from relitigating
whether the documents fell under FOIA’s trade-secrets exemption.  But pre-
clusion—the power to bind someone to the results of a lawsuit—generally
may apply only to someone who has enjoyed a “day in court.”3  Consequently,
the Supreme Court unanimously found that due process prohibited a court
from binding the second plaintiff through preclusion.4  So, he was allowed to
revisit the applicability of the FOIA exemption.  And he won.5  The docu-
ments then effectively became available to the entire world, including the
first plaintiff.
A similar phenomenon arises in the class certification context.  If a law-
yer seeks class certification but a court denies the motion, that specific deci-
1 553 U.S. 880 (2008).
2 See id. at 885–87.
3 Id. at 892–93.
4 See id. at 904–06.
5 See Taylor v. Babbitt, 760 F. Supp. 2d 80, 85–90 (D.D.C. 2011).  Admittedly, the
court in the second lawsuit was able to consider two critical questions—whether the docu-
ments at issue were “secret” and “commercially valuable”—that the plaintiff in the first
lawsuit had failed to raise. See id. at 87 n.6, 90.
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sion—whether class treatment is appropriate—binds only the named
plaintiffs.  At that point, before a court actually certifies a class, only the
named plaintiffs (rather than the members of the class that they hope to
represent) are parties.6  The lawyers and the putative class members may try
again to get class certification in a different court.  All they need are new
named plaintiffs, and in many situations a lawyer “has available a seemingly
endless string of totally fungible potential named plaintiffs.”7  Thus, the law-
yers may try over and over and over until a court certifies the class.8
In both of these scenarios, regardless of how many times a defendant
wins (either in preventing a document from being disclosed or in resisting
class certification), people who did not participate in the lawsuit are not
bound by the results of the earlier lawsuits.  So, a new plaintiff may always
come along to relitigate the same question.  Notice what happens when even
a single plaintiff prevails: that victory effectively nullifies all of the defen-
dant’s previous victories.  If a document is finally disclosed under FOIA, that
victory belongs to everyone, including plaintiffs who had previously lost.  If a
class is eventually certified, the plaintiffs’ lawyers and the entire class of plain-
tiffs (minus the unsuccessful named plaintiffs from previous attempts)
achieve what they wanted all along: class certification.9  From the plaintiffs’
perspective, this isn’t quite a “heads I win, tails you lose” situation but more
of a “heads I win, tails I get a do-over” scenario.
Although the problem of limitless serial litigation has become more
urgent in recent years, attempts to combat it have run headlong into the
presumption against nonparty preclusion.  Preclusion rules prevent parties
from revisiting matters that they have already litigated.10  A corollary of that
principle is that preclusion usually does not apply to nonparties, who have
6 See Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299, 312–15 (2011); Martin H. Redish & Megan
B. Kiernan, Avoiding Death by a Thousand Cuts: The Relitigation of Class Certification and the
Realities of the Modern Class Action, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1659, 1674–78 (2014).
7 Redish & Kiernan, supra note 6, at 1670; see also In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.,
Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763, 766–67 (7th Cir. 2003), abrogated on other grounds by
Smith, 564 U.S. 299; Tobias Barrington Wolff, Federal Jurisdiction and Due Process in the Era of
the Nationwide Class Action, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2035, 2073–74 (2008).
8 The Supreme Court has suggested that comity among courts offers a flexible mech-
anism to ameliorate the problem of serial litigation. See Smith, 564 U.S. at 317.
9 See Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 766.
10 On a terminological note, I intentionally group together the distinct but related
doctrines of claim preclusion and issue preclusion.  For present purposes, the similarities
rather than the differences are most germane.  Consequently, references to “preclusion”
pertain to both.  If and when the differences are important, I make clear which species of
preclusion I am discussing.
Claim preclusion generally means the extinguishing of all aspects of a claim that a party
could have brought, but did not bring, as part of an earlier lawsuit. See RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (AM. LAW INST. 1982).  By contrast, issue preclusion generally pre-
vents a party from relitigating a specific question that was actually litigated and decided in
earlier litigation and arises again in another lawsuit. See id. § 27.
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not yet benefited from their own “day in court.”  Although courts11 and com-
mentators12 have suggested creative and roundabout ways to deal with serial
litigation, those solutions are likely to be partial, imperfect, or infeasible.13
The way out of the thicket, though, might have been hiding in plain sight all
along.
While the Supreme Court has continued to reaffirm the “day-in-court”
ideal and the overarching rule against nonparty preclusion, it has casually
observed that precedent can achieve what preclusion cannot.  In spare lan-
guage and with no analysis, the Court has suggested that precedent, rather
than preclusion, may prevent nonparties from revisiting matters that courts
have already decided.14  Return for a moment to the FOIA case, Taylor v.
Sturgell, and assume that the second plaintiff had brought his claim in the
same circuit as had the first plaintiff.  A court could not bind the second
plaintiff to the results of the first lawsuit through preclusion.  Nonetheless, as
the Supreme Court observed, binding precedent from the first lawsuit could
achieve the same result—preventing the second plaintiff from relitigating
whether FOIA’s trade-secrets exemption applied to the documents in
question.15
Does this mean that courts can solve the problem of serial litigation sim-
ply by invoking precedent instead of preclusion?  Not quite.  Binding prece-
dent typically operates only within a single jurisdiction and thus can shut
down multiple attempts to litigate a question only within that jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs remain free to move from court to court within the federal system
or between different states as they seek to relitigate certain matters, subject
only to loose notions of comity among courts.
Nevertheless, juxtaposing the concepts of precedent and preclusion—
and their inconsistent approaches to the “day-in-court” ideal—reveals a curi-
ous but ultimately productive conundrum.  If binding a nonparty through
preclusion is usually unconstitutional, why would accomplishing the same
goal through stare decisis be so unobjectionable as to require no analysis?  In
both situations, a nonparty is bound by a lawsuit in which she had no oppor-
tunity to participate.  But in only one situation may a party insist on her day
in court.
Traditionally, courts and scholars have conceptualized the doctrines of
precedent and preclusion as governing fundamentally different questions
11 See Smith, 564 U.S. at 317 (arguing that stare decisis can “mitigate the sometimes
substantial costs of similar litigation brought by different plaintiffs”).
12 See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
13 See infra note 27 and accompanying text (describing why stare decisis cannot fully
alleviate the problem of serial litigation); see also Tobias Barrington Wolff, Multiple Attempts
at Class Certification, 99 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 137, 138 (2014) (criticizing proposal to bind
lawyers in class certification context).
14 See Smith, 564 U.S. at 317 (“[O]ur legal system generally relies on principles of stare
decisis . . . to mitigate the sometimes substantial costs of similar litigation brought by differ-
ent plaintiffs.”).
15 See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 903 (2008) (noting that “stare decisis will allow
courts swiftly to dispose of repetitive suits brought in the same circuit”).
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and operating with different force.  In the usual telling, preclusion attaches
only to fact-intensive determinations, and when it applies, it applies abso-
lutely.16  By contrast, precedent typically governs larger legal questions, and
even though it can exert binding pressure in future cases, it supposedly
applies with greater flexibility.17  Indeed, as the Supreme Court has repeat-
edly counseled, stare decisis “is not an inexorable command.”18
But the traditional distinctions between precedent and preclusion have
largely faded and, in some instances, collapsed entirely.  Increasingly, prece-
dent and preclusion can govern the same questions and apply under the
same circumstances, yet they offer diametrically opposed answers as to who is
bound by the results of litigation.  Although some scholars have started to
document the doctrinal convergence,19 this Article offers the first systematic
analysis of the phenomenon and its surprising theoretical implications.  The
whole concept of binding precedent—a bedrock principle of Anglo-Ameri-
can legal systems—suggests that courts’ unflagging insistence that each per-
son is entitled to a day in court before preclusion may attach is misguided or
even completely wrong.
The doctrinal tension between precedent and preclusion exposes a
deeper and unresolved theoretical conundrum that cuts to the heart of what
due process protects.  In attempting to unravel that conundrum, I argue that
two different visions of due process have animated the doctrines.
On the preclusion side, the Supreme Court has articulated a view of due
process that vindicates participation-oriented autonomy concerns.  It reflects
the idea that individualized participation in a lawsuit—giving each person a
day in court—serves values beyond just the desire to resolve cases accurately,
including dignity and autonomy.
The precise due process theory that undergirds binding precedent is
more obscure.  I argue, though, that it is a fully justifiable practice, albeit one
that is irreconcilable with the participation-oriented “day-in-court” ideal that
features prominently in the preclusion context.  Instead, binding precedent
is rooted in an outcome-oriented theory of due process, a theory focused, in
large part, on protecting expectations, predictability, repose, and—perhaps
counterintuitively—accuracy.
The outcome-oriented theory that best explains binding precedent, in
fact, dominates most areas of civil procedure.  It is also the norm outside of
the litigation context, particularly in the realms of administrative law and
16 See Evan Tsen Lee, Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The Example of Mootness, 105
HARV. L. REV. 603, 652 (1992).
17 See ROBERT C. CASAD & KEVIN M. CLERMONT, RES JUDICATA: A HANDBOOK ON ITS
THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE 15 (2001).
18 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 233 (2009) (quoting State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522
U.S. 3, 20 (1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 577 (2003).
19 See Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011, 1071
(2003); Max Minzner, Saving Stare Decisis: Preclusion, Precedent, and Procedural Due Process,
2010 BYU L. REV. 597.
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legislation.20  Moreover, especially with respect to litigation, an outcome-ori-
ented theory is normatively superior to a vision of due process that privileges
participation for its own sake.  Most critically, the outcome-oriented theory
would afford courts a more capacious power to bind nonparties and thus
could point the way toward solving the problem of potentially limitless serial
litigation.
This Article proceeds in three Parts.  Part I discusses why preclusion is
uniquely suited to address problems of serial litigation but how the Supreme
Court has unduly circumscribed that power.  Part II illustrates the doctrinal
tension between precedent and preclusion.  It demonstrates that the two doc-
trines often govern the same questions but that precedent can achieve what
preclusion cannot—the power to bind nonparties.  Part III argues that two
different theories of due process underpin the doctrines of precedent and
preclusion in their current forms.  It then demonstrates why the outcome-
oriented theory, already dominant in most areas of law, holds the key to cur-
tailing repetitive lawsuits.
I. SERIAL LITIGATION AND THE LIMITS OF PRECLUSION
Problems of serial litigation have become particularly vexing in recent
decades.21  Although courts have various doctrinal mechanisms at their dis-
posal to confront these problems, the most effective way to prevent litigants
from getting multiple bites at the proverbial apple is to apply preclusion to a
wider swath of people, including nonparties.  Courts actually laid the theoret-
ical foundation for a more capacious doctrine of nonparty preclusion when
they expanded preclusion’s reach in the twentieth century.  But the Supreme
Court has consistently affirmed the idea that due process generally prohibits
courts from applying preclusion to someone who has not yet had her day in
court.  This Part explicates that basic dilemma—preclusion’s unique poten-
tial to address serial litigation but the Court’s cabining of that power.  It also
sets the stage for exploring the curious interaction of precedent and
preclusion.
A. Unresolved Problems of Serial Litigation
Serial litigation raises a host of obvious concerns.  When people are
allowed to litigate the same question over and over, there are intuitively wor-
ries about inefficiency (devoting too many public resources to litigating the
same matter) and even inaccuracy (if people litigating the same question
achieve different results, at least one of the results must be wrong).  Some-
times those risks are the necessary price of protecting litigants’ due process
rights, but the costs are real.
20 See infra notes 260–268.
21 See In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763, 766
(7th Cir. 2003), abrogated on other grounds by Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299 (2011)
(noting proliferation of repeated attempts to certify class actions in different jurisdictions).
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Certain classes of cases exacerbate those baseline concerns about ineffi-
ciency and inaccuracy, often with little or no corresponding due process ben-
efit.  The most problematic forms of serial litigation involve lawsuits, such as
those briefly sketched above, that can effectively undo earlier litigation.22
This category includes public rights cases, such as FOIA lawsuits, and
class certification denials.  The Freedom of Information Act confers an indi-
vidual right to request a document and to litigate whether the government
may refuse to disclose the document.23  In Taylor, notwithstanding that the
two plaintiffs were friends and had coordinated their efforts to obtain partic-
ular documents,24 each was allowed to bring his own separate claim and mar-
shal his own arguments.  Thus, when the second plaintiff won his lawsuit,25
both got exactly what they wanted.  The same thing would have happened if
ninety-nine requesters had lost their lawsuits but the one hundredth person
finally prevailed.
An almost identical phenomenon occurs with respect to class certifica-
tion denials.  If a lawyer seeks to certify a class of plaintiffs in one court but
fails, only the named plaintiffs are bound by that futile attempt.  The lawyers
and all of the other members of the putative class may try again and again in
different courts until they succeed.26  Consequently, in both the public rights
cases and the class certification denials, a single victory essentially nullifies
the earlier losses.
Not every attempt to revisit a particular question will be problematic, but
when serial litigation prevents a defendant from ever achieving repose or
affords certain parties multiple opportunities to litigate a matter, there is at
least the prospect of basic unfairness.  Under these circumstances, nonparty
preclusion offers the single best way to regulate the problem.  Other doc-
trines and devices certainly can mitigate the inefficiency and unfairness, but
they are, at best, partial fixes.
For example, stare decisis, as the Supreme Court has noted, eventually
can shut down truly repetitive lawsuits.27  But because precedent is binding
only along the lines of vertical hierarchy within a particular jurisdiction, a
defendant must still endure many lawsuits throughout the country.  Moreo-
ver, a defendant’s loss in any given lawsuit could undo all of its earlier
victories.
Similarly, a class action, which can dispose of related claims in a single
proceeding, is often of little help in these situations.  In a FOIA case like
22 See supra notes 1–8 and accompanying text.
23 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A) (2012).
24 See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 887–89 (2008) (noting that Herrick and Taylor
were friends, used the same lawyer, and otherwise assisted each other in pursuing the
documents).
25 See Taylor v. Babbitt, 760 F. Supp. 2d 80, 85–90 (D.D.C. 2011).  Although FOIA does
not require an agency to make a document publicly available—but instead only to disclose
it to the individual requester—nothing prevents the requester from sharing the document
with others. Id. at 87.
26 See Bridgestone/Firestone, 333 F.3d at 766–67.
27 Taylor, 553 U.S. at 903.
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Taylor, the initial plaintiff theoretically can satisfy the requirements of a class
action under Federal Rule 23.28  But no plaintiff would actually go to the
trouble of seeking class certification because class treatment would offer him
nothing that he could not achieve on his own (that is, the requested docu-
ments).29  If anything, a plaintiff in a public rights case has an incentive not
to seek certification precisely so that others can attempt to relitigate the mat-
ter in the event that the first plaintiff loses.  And with respect to the problem
of class certification denials, a class action—by definition—is ineffectual.
Certifying a class for the purpose of determining whether that class should be
certified would be the epitome of impermissible (and nonsensical)
bootstrapping.
Commentators have suggested other mechanisms to deal with the most
deleterious forms of serial litigation.  For example, they have suggested
preventing lawyers from bringing repetitive motions for class certification30
or empowering courts to enjoin sister courts from entertaining such duplica-
tive motions.31  Such proposals, though, are likely to be partial, imperfect, or
doctrinally infeasible, as even some of their advocates concede.32
In all of these situations, preclusion—and, in particular, nonparty pre-
clusion—offers unique advantages for mitigating the most bedeviling ineffi-
ciencies and inequities that arise from serial litigation.  Preclusion gives
courts the power to find that when a matter has been fully and fairly litigated,
a decision will be binding even on people who did not participate in the
lawsuit.  It is a doctrine that is not confined to a single jurisdiction, and it may
readily apply in both state and federal courts.  Binding a nonparty to the
results of a lawsuit in which she did not participate undoubtedly presents a
number of potential pitfalls.  However, as discussed in Part III, those con-
cerns do not justify the overwhelming rejection of nonparty preclusion.  Most
significantly for the purposes of this Article, limiting the reach of nonparty
preclusion, particularly in the limited sense suggested here, is difficult to
understand in light of how courts have long accepted the power of precedent
to bind nonparties.
28 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
29 Samuel Issacharoff, Private Claims, Aggregate Rights, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 183, 207.
30 See Redish & Kiernan, supra note 6, at 1674–78 (proposing a guardianship model
that would preclude lawyers, rather than litigants, as a way to deal with serial attempts at
class certification).
31 See Wolff, supra note 7, at 2066–72 (arguing that federal courts should be able to
rely on an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act—for injunctions “in aid of” a federal
court’s jurisdiction—to enjoin certain successive attempts at class certification).
32 See Wolff, supra note 13, at 138 (criticizing Redish and Kiernan’s proposal to pre-
clude lawyers as frequently ineffectual and a violation of due process principles).  Wolff’s
own proposal under the Anti-Injunction Act is cogent and eminently sensible. See Wolff,
supra note 7, at 2066–72.  It offers only a partial fix, most notably because it empowers only
federal courts to enjoin duplicative litigation. Id. at 2043.
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B. Expanding Preclusion
Considering preclusion’s singular power to combat the worst excesses of
serial litigation, the Supreme Court’s continuing reaffirmation of each per-
son’s right to a day in court is at least somewhat surprising.  Beginning in the
middle of the twentieth century, courts expanded preclusion’s reach in three
important ways.  Each of these developments was somehow incomplete, ill-
fated, or at the very least undertheorized.  Nonetheless, they all underscored
preclusion’s unique promise to deal with an array of modern procedural
challenges and the importance of moving away from the intuitive, but ulti-
mately unsatisfactory, attractiveness of the individual day-in-court ideal.
Others have documented these developments in rich and informative detail.
I sketch them briefly in order to elucidate the broader and enduring
problems that they sought to resolve.
The first development is the modern class action.  Although representa-
tive suits predated the class action device as lawyers know it today, the mod-
ern class action is unique because of the extent to which it denies individuals
a day in court and uses nonparty preclusion to resolve related claims in a
single proceeding.33  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have always
allowed for class actions.  But until 1966, class actions—other than “true”
class actions—did not bind absent class members.34  In fact, members of
what were then known as “hybrid” and “spurious” classes could sit out the
litigation and later opt in to the class in order to take advantage of a
favorable judgment.35
This all changed in 1966 when the federal class action rule took its mod-
ern form, abandoning the distinctions between the different kinds of classes
and introducing a sweeping rule of preclusion.  This revision was “first and
foremost a res judicata device.”36  Although that development was and
remains controversial, it transformed the class action into a broader tool for
binding absentees—people who never have an individual day in court—to
the results of the litigation.  The expansion of nonparty preclusion in this
context is rooted in the belief (and requirement) that the class representa-
33 See Robert G. Bone, The Puzzling Idea of Adjudicative Representation: Lessons for Aggre-
gate Litigation and Class Actions, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 577, 607–10 (2011); see also FED. R.
CIV. P. 23(a), (b).
34 Bone, supra note 33, at 608.  A true class action was one in which class members
held rights jointly and in an undifferentiated way.  For example, if the members of an
unincorporated association bring a suit to vindicate an organizational interest, that interest
is undifferentiated.  James Wm. Moore & Marcus Cohn, Federal Class Actions, 32 ILL. L. REV.
307, 314 (1937).
35 Bone, supra note 33, at 608.  As Moore and Cohn note, even though the members
of a hybrid class (usually claimants to a limited fund) could formally choose to sit out the
litigation, as a practical matter they had to join because the class action likely would have
disposed of the entire fund and left nothing else that absentees could later pursue. See
Moore & Cohn, supra note 34, at 317; see also David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class
Action, Part I: Sturm und Drang, 1953–1980, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 587, 600–01 (2013) (not-
ing the limited preclusive effects of class actions before the 1960s).
36 Bone, supra note 33, at 609.
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tives will adequately represent the absentees’ interests.37  Indeed, this explicit
and formal procedural protection—ensuring that class representatives will
litigate in the interests of absent members—has led the Supreme Court and
some commentators to refer to class actions as exceptional in their ability to
bind those absentees.38  Although that characterization remains open to criti-
cal debate—both descriptively and normatively, as discussed later39—the
class action signifies the greatest modern expansion of nonparty preclusion.
The second major development is that courts largely have abandoned
the mutuality requirement in preclusion.  Traditionally, preclusion required
symmetry of the parties, such that only someone who was a party to earlier
litigation could invoke the benefits of preclusion in a subsequent proceed-
ing.40  In the middle of the twentieth century, though, courts began to ques-
tion the wisdom of the traditional approach and gradually allowed
nonparties to the first litigation to take advantage of issue preclusion in later
litigation.41
Initially, the expansion came as courts permitted someone who had not
been a party to an earlier lawsuit to use preclusion defensively against some-
one who had participated in the first litigation.42  Although somewhat more
controversial, courts also began to allow nonparties to use issue preclusion
offensively.43  As courts overwhelmingly rejected the old doctrine of mutuality,
though, they made one requirement abundantly clear: the person against
37 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4) (articulating the requirement that “the representative
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class”).
38 See, e.g., Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 901 (2008); Richard A. Nagareda, The Preex-
istence Principle and the Structure of the Class Action, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 150–51 (2003).
39 See infra Section I.C; see also Bone, supra note 33, at 578 (challenging “class action
exceptionalism”).
40 DAVID L. SHAPIRO, CIVIL PROCEDURE: PRECLUSION IN CIVIL ACTIONS 102 (2001); 18A
CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4448 (2d ed. 2002).
41 This is one of the rare situations, for my purposes, when the difference between
claim preclusion and issue preclusion is meaningful.  Although courts largely have aban-
doned the doctrine of mutuality with respect to issue preclusion, mutuality endures as a
requirement of claim preclusion. See Michael J. Waggoner, Fifty Years of Bernhard v. Bank
of America Is Enough: Collateral Estoppel Should Require Mutuality but Res Judicata Should Not,
12 REV. LITIGATION 391, 392 (1993).
42 For example, A sues B for negligence in a three-way car accident, and B prevails on
the ground that A was contributorily negligent. A then sues C for negligence stemming
from the same accident. C, though not a party in the first lawsuit, may defensively argue
that A is precluded from relitigating the question of his contributory negligence.  The
Supreme Court endorsed defensive nonmutual issue preclusion in 1971. See Blonder-
Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 328–50 (1971).
43 The most conspicuous problem is that unlike in the defensive context, a party that
potentially wants to use nonmutual issue preclusion offensively often has an incentive to
adopt a wait-and-see approach.  The Supreme Court acknowledged this problem but none-
theless, with certain caveats, permitted offensive nonmutual issue preclusion. See Parklane
Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329–33 (1979).
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whom preclusion is being applied must have been a party to the initial
litigation.44
Because the demise of mutuality changed only who is allowed to invoke
preclusion (but not those against whom it is invoked), a serious asymmetry
arose.  To borrow Brainerd Currie’s famous example,45 imagine a train acci-
dent in which fifty people are injured.  The first passenger sues the train
company, which a jury finds not negligent.  When the second passenger sues,
the defendant may not take advantage of issue preclusion with respect to its
non-negligence because the second passenger was not a party to the first law-
suit.  Suppose that the second passenger also loses at trial.  As do the third,
fourth, and so on.  Then the twenty-sixth passenger brings a lawsuit and
prevails, with a jury finding the train company negligent.  At that point, the
remaining passengers could theoretically rely on issue preclusion against the
train company, which was a party during the twenty-sixth trial when a jury
found it negligent, yet the train company would still be barred from using
the first twenty-five findings of non-negligence.46  Thus, the asymmetry
results.47  A nonparty may invoke what it regards as a favorable judgment
against the train company, but the train company may not invoke what it
regards as a favorable judgment against a nonparty.
As courts increasingly have rejected the doctrine of mutuality, they have
taken pains to preserve the traditional rule that a nonparty may not be
bound by an unfavorable judgment.  The results have led to a conceptual
and theoretical tension.  On the one hand, abandoning a rigid insistence on
mutuality has expanded preclusion in a way that courts and scholars over-
whelmingly regard as sensible.  At the same time, the asymmetry has exposed
a rift between the values that have animated a broader application of preclu-
sion (including efficiency and accuracy) and those underpinning an insis-
tence that a nonparty may not be bound by a judgment (including an
emphasis on each party’s right to an individual day in court).48  Moreover,
the asymmetry has laid the intellectual groundwork for some scholars to
argue in favor of even more extensive nonparty preclusion.49
The third and final development that expanded the reach of nonparty
preclusion over the last several decades was the reinvigoration of “virtual rep-
resentation.”  In its modern form, the doctrine offered a way to bind a person
44 See id. at 327 n.7; Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 329; James R. Pielemeier, Due Process
Limitations on the Application of Collateral Estoppel Against Nonparties to Prior Litigation, 63 B.U.
L. REV. 383, 387 (1983).
45 See Brainerd Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9
STAN. L. REV. 281 (1957).
46 Id. at 285–86.
47 See Michael A. Berch, A Proposal to Permit Collateral Estoppel of Nonparties Seeking Affirm-
ative Relief, 1979 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 511, 530–31; Lawrence C. George, Sweet Uses of Adversity:
Parklane Hosiery and the Collateral Class Action, 32 STAN. L. REV. 655, 660 (1980).
48 See Pielemeier, supra note 44, at 384 (noting that the rule against binding nonpar-
ties usually rests only on “conclusory statements that all litigants must be given their ‘day in
court’”).
49 See Berch, supra note 47, at 531–34; George, supra note 47, at 674–75.
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to a judgment based on the theory that even though the person had not
actually participated in the litigation, her interests had been adequately rep-
resented.50  Unlike in a certified class action, though, the relationship
between the nonparty and her “virtual representative” did not need to be
formalized.51  To some commentators, that practical fluidity was among the
doctrine’s principal virtues.52  But to others, virtual representation was a
“rash act of judicial frustration” that elided critical protections.53
The doctrine of virtual representation actually dates back to the eight-
eenth century when, in its earlier incarnations, it operated as a way to bind
the holders of future property interests.54  The modern version, though, is
quite different in purpose and scope.  It explicitly relies on the idea that pre-
clusion can attach based on an alignment of parties’ and nonparties’
interests.55
Among the most useful applications of virtual representation was in the
corporate context.  A sole shareholder of a corporation (or the parent com-
pany of a wholly owned subsidiary) could be bound by a judgment against
the other.56  Even though the shareholder was not formally a party to the
lawsuit in his individual capacity, the close alignment of the party’s and non-
party’s interests justified the application of preclusion to both.57  Similarly, a
corporate officer who was not formally a party to litigation involving the cor-
poration itself could be bound by a judgment against the corporation.  The
50 See Martin H. Redish & William J. Katt, Taylor v. Sturgell, Procedural Due Process, and
the Day-in-Court Ideal: Resolving the Virtual Representation Dilemma, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1877, 1878 (2009).
51 See id. at 1881.
52 See Allan D. Vestal, Res Judicata/Preclusion: Expansion, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 357, 377–81
(1974) (endorsing virtual representation and analogizing its operation to class actions); see
also Bone, supra note 33, at 617, 624 (arguing that “there is no sharp distinction” between
formal class actions and “other types of large-scale case aggregation”).
53 Issacharoff, supra note 29, at 200; see also Redish & Katt, supra note 50, at 1882–83.
54 Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the “Day in Court” Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion, 67 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 193, 203–11 (1992).
55 The modern version of virtual representation arguably started to take shape in the
1960s. See Vestal, supra note 52, at 363–73 (documenting cases).  Most scholars trace the
modern doctrine’s genesis to the 1970s. See Barrett, supra note 19, at 1037 n.103; Bone,
supra note 54, at 219–20.
56 See, e.g., In re Gottheiner, 703 F.2d 1136, 1138–40 (9th Cir. 1983) (binding sole
shareholder); Waddell & Reed Fin., Inc. v. Torchmark Corp., 223 F.R.D. 566, 616–19 (D.
Kan. 2004) (binding a subsidiary to a judgment against different subsidiaries of the same
parent corporation); cf. Pollard v. Cockrell, 578 F.2d 1002, 1008–09 (5th Cir. 1978) (dis-
cussing virtual representation in the corporate context).
57 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 59 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1982)
(noting that for preclusion purposes “there is no good reason why a closely held corpora-
tion and its owners should be ordinarily regarded as legally distinct”).
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corporation, in other words, could serve as the officer’s virtual
representative.58
The doctrinal contours of virtual representation were never especially
clear.59  Two of its most essential hallmarks, though, were an identity of inter-
ests between the nonparty and her virtual representative and the absence of a
formal litigation arrangement between them.60  What else the doctrine
required and how broadly it would sweep varied—sometimes dramatically—
from court to court.  In its broadest formulation, virtual representation
rested on nothing other than an alignment of interests,61 but most courts
required something else.  Some insisted that there had to be a preexisting
relationship of accountability between the nonparty and her virtual represen-
tative.62  Others simply considered an amorphous multiplicity of factors,
none of which were either necessary or sufficient.63  Two courts attempted to
rationalize the doctrine by grounding it in an identity of interests and ade-
quate representation but also requiring courts to consider several other equi-
table factors.64  Others intimated that virtual representation was not even a
doctrine,65 and at least one court explicitly rejected it.66
C. Retrenchment of the Day-in-Court Ideal
The three attempts to expand preclusion doctrine have proved to be
something of a mixed bag.  The modern class action undoubtedly has
effected the greatest expansion of nonparty preclusion, but in recent years
courts have limited which cases are suitable for class treatment.67  While the
demise of mutuality made preclusion more widely available—to the extent
58 See, e.g., Irwin v. Mascott, 370 F.3d 924, 929–31 (9th Cir. 2004) (concluding that
officer was bound by an injunction against the corporation and could be held in contempt
for violating it).
59 See 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 40, § 4457; see also Barrett, supra note 19, at 1038
(contrasting broad and narrow forms of virtual representation).
60 See Redish & Katt, supra note 50, at 1878.
61 See, e.g., Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710, 719–20 (5th Cir. 1975).
62 See, e.g., Klugh v. United States, 818 F.2d 294, 300 (4th Cir. 1987); Pollard v. Cock-
rell, 578 F.2d 1002, 1008–09 (5th Cir. 1978).
63 See, e.g., Tyus v. Schoemehl, 93 F.3d 449, 455–56 (8th Cir. 1996) (articulating seven
factors that a court should consider); see also Gonzalez v. Banco Cent. Corp., 27 F.3d 751,
760–61 (1st Cir. 1994) (noting that “[t]here is no black-letter rule”).
64 See Taylor v. Blakey, 490 F.3d 965, 971–72 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (describing identity of
interests and adequate representation as necessary factors and requiring an additional
showing of a close relationship, substantial participation, or tactical maneuvering), vacated
and remanded sub nom. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008); Irwin v. Mascott, 370 F.3d
924, 929–30 (9th Cir. 2004) (similar).
65 See Gonzalez, 27 F.3d at 761 (describing virtual representation as an equitable the-
ory); see also Taylor, 553 U.S. at 896 (noting that some virtual representation theories are no
broader than existing exceptions to rule against nonparty preclusion).
66 See Tice v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 162 F.3d 966, 971–73 (7th Cir. 1998).
67 See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011) (tightening the stan-
dards for “commonality” under FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2) and limiting the availability of FED.
R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) class actions); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1300–02
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that nonparties now may invoke it more readily—it has not led to a concomi-
tant power to bind nonparties.68  And in 2008, the Supreme Court in Taylor v.
Sturgell, almost assuredly sounded the death knell for virtual representa-
tion,69 disapproving what it regarded as “de facto class actions” minus the pro-
cedural protections of an actual class action.70
The Court repeatedly invokes the “deep-rooted historic tradition that
everyone should have his own day in court.”71  Accordingly, before preclu-
sion may attach, each person presumptively is entitled to her own day in
court as part of the due process right to be heard.72  As a result, even as many
courts have expanded the availability of nonmutual issue preclusion, they
have reiterated the overarching rule, subject to only “a handful of discrete
and limited exceptions,” that a nonparty is not bound by a judgment.73
Moreover, the trends that some commentators had identified did not signal a
broader approach to preclusion.  Instead, the Supreme Court in recent years
has expressly disapproved some of those experiments or treated them as
exceptions that prove the rule.
When the Court in Taylor rejected virtual representation, it offered the
most comprehensive defense of how the day-in-court ideal should function.
After reiterating the presumption against nonparty preclusion, the Court
organized “recognized exceptions” to that rule into a taxonomy of six catego-
ries.74  Three of those exceptions permit preclusion when the nonparty has
received additional procedural protections.  They include situations in which
the nonparty was the proxy of an actual party from earlier litigation, had
assumed actual control of the prior lawsuit, or was adequately represented
through a formal representative action (such as litigation by a fiduciary or
through a properly certified class action).75  Two exceptions essentially flow
(7th Cir. 1995) (limiting the availability of a class action in multistate mass tort cases when
plaintiffs could not show that the applicable legal standards were truly the same).
68 See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 n.7 (1979) (“It is a viola-
tion of due process for a judgment to be binding on a litigant who was not a party or a
privy and therefore has never had an opportunity to be heard.”).
69 See Minzner, supra note 19, at 602 n.20; Richard A. Nagareda, Embedded Aggregation
in Civil Litigation, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1105, 1123 (2010); Redish & Katt, supra note 50, at
1878, 1887.
70 Taylor, 553 U.S. at 901 (quoting Tice, 162 F.3d at 973).
71 Id. at 892–93 (quoting Richards v. Jefferson Cty., 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996)); Rich-
ards, 517 U.S. at 798 (quoting 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 40, § 4449); Martin v. Wilks,
490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989) (quoting 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 40, § 4449); see also Ortiz
v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846 (1999) (noting the “day-in-court ideal”).
72 See Richards, 517 U.S. at 798–99 (linking day-in-court ideal with the due process
right to be heard); see also Martin, 490 U.S. at 761–62 (discussing day-in-court ideal); Rock
v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51 (1987) (stating that the right to a day in court is a “necessary
ingredient[ ]” of due process); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (discussing
due process right to be heard).
73 Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299, 312 (2011); see also Taylor, 553 U.S. at 898.
74 See Taylor, 553 U.S. at 893–95.  For a similar taxonomy that organizes the exceptions
into eight categories, see Pielemeier, supra note 44, at 388–91.
75 See Taylor, 553 U.S. at 894–95; see also Minzner, supra note 19, at 619.
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from the needs of property law, permitting nonparty preclusion based on
certain preexisting legal relationships (such as between a property owner and
a successor in interest) and certain statutory schemes (such as probate and
bankruptcy proceedings) that conclusively resolve property claims.76  And,
most straightforwardly, a nonparty may be bound through actual consent.77
Taylor emphasized the limited and discrete nature of these exceptions, and it
was particularly critical of suggestions that a nonparty could be adequately
represented without the formal procedural protections of a class action.78
In some ways, the reticence toward expanding nonparty preclusion
might be surprising.  Scholars had begun to identify nascent trends toward a
more liberal approach to preclusion and had begun to call for courts to
embrace broader preclusion principles.79  To its detractors, though, non-
party preclusion was a siren song—an intellectually unsatisfying and poten-
tially dangerous way to approach these problems.80  What some scholars
identified as the virtues of nonparty preclusion—including its flexibility and
functional similarity to class actions81—ultimately wound up being the down-
fall of the more aggressive attempts to expand that doctrine.82
II. THE PROBLEM OF PRECEDENT
Despite the promise of nonparty preclusion, the Supreme Court has reit-
erated the strong presumption, subject to only carefully delineated excep-
tions, that preclusion may not apply to a person who has not had her day in
court.  At the same time, the day-in-court ideal hardly ever comes up with
respect to precedent, which can bind nonparties in exactly the same way as
preclusion.  If binding nonparties through preclusion presents myriad due
process concerns, why does binding nonparties through precedent raise no
constitutional difficulties at all?
Most scholarship—including important doctrinal and philosophical dis-
cussions of precedent83 and a robust debate about constitutional stare deci-
sis84—approaches precedent as an institutional constraint that primarily
76 See Taylor, 553 U.S. at 894–95.
77 See id. at 893–94.
78 See id. at 901.
79 See Berch, supra note 47, at 531–34; George, supra note 47, at 655–56, 674–75; Ves-
tal, supra note 52, at 377–81.
80 See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 29, at 200; Pielemeier, supra note 44, at 384.
81 See Berch, supra note 47, at 520–21; George, supra note 47, at 664.
82 See Taylor, 553 U.S. at 901 (disapproving virtual representation because it lacked the
formal protections of class actions).
83 See, e.g., NEIL DUXBURY, THE NATURE AND AUTHORITY OF PRECEDENT (2008); Larry
Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 1–5 (1989); Charles L. Barzun,
Impeaching Precedent, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1625, 1625 (2013); Evan H. Caminker, Why Must
Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 817 (1994); Frederick
Schauer, Essay, Authority and Authorities, 94 VA. L. REV. 1931, 1931–35 (2008); Frederick
Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 571–72 (1987) [hereinafter Schauer, Precedent].
84 Constitutional stare decisis refers to the Supreme Court’s presumption that it
should not lightly disturb its earlier interpretations of the Constitution. See, e.g., Richard
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affects other adjudicators.85  Very little inquiry has focused on the potential
due process concerns that binding precedent potentially raises.86  This Part
contributes to that nascent conversation.  After briefly clearing some defini-
tional and doctrinal underbrush, it explores the extent to which precedent
and preclusion have converged.  Specifically, it shows that binding prece-
dent, like preclusion before it, now sweeps far more broadly than most courts
and commentators assume; it demonstrates that the doctrines functionally (if
not formally) are subject to similar exceptions; and it assesses the doctrines’
procedural similarities.  Critically, this Part also treats the remaining distinc-
tions between precedent and preclusion—whether they apply across jurisdic-
tional boundaries and whether a lower court can create law that a higher
court must follow.  Although these differences are real, they ultimately have
no bearing on why one doctrine should be fraught with due process concerns
while the other is not.
A. The Mechanics of Precedent
Broadly construed, precedent can mean that a decision, once made, has
at least some persuasive force based only on its historical pedigree.87  The
present analysis, though, focuses on the concept of binding precedent to
explore an obligation that inheres in certain types of precedential deci-
sions.88  The nature and force of this obligation can vary from court to court.
For example, a precedent might be binding on some courts but not others;
the obligation might be rather weak or verge on absolute.  Although the vari-
ations are often quite interesting and feature in some of the analysis that
follows, a working definition of the overarching concept is useful.
H. Fallon, Jr., Essay, Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on Constitutional Methodology,
76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 570, 570 (2001); John Harrison, Essay, The Power of Congress over the Rules
of Precedent, 50 DUKE L.J. 503 (2000); Thomas Healy, Stare Decisis as a Constitutional Require-
ment, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 43 (2001); Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent: Congressional Regula-
tion of Judicial Decision-Making, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 191 (2001); Henry Paul Monaghan,
Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723 (1988); Michael Stokes
Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe
and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535 (2000); David L. Shapiro, The Role of Precedent in Constitu-
tional Adjudication: An Introspection, 86 TEX. L. REV. 929 (2008).
85 See Barrett, supra note 19, at 1029; see also Barzun, supra note 83, at 1647 (noting
rule-of-law values that precedent fosters, including political stability); Caleb Nelson, Stare
Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2001) (describing stare
decisis as a practice that arose in order to constrain courts’ arbitrary exercise of
discretion).
86 For rare exceptions, see Barrett, supra note 19, at 1060–74, and Minzner, supra note
19, at 600–12.
87 See Schauer, Precedent, supra note 83, at 571.
88 Courts and scholars sometimes use the term “stare decisis” to refer to one court’s
nearly absolute duty to follow another court’s earlier decision. See, e.g., Taylor v. Sturgell,
553 U.S. 880, 903 (2008) (noting that “stare decisis will allow courts swiftly to dispose of
repetitive suits brought in the same circuit”).  Stare decisis simply acknowledges that ear-
lier decisions merit some weight, but I am principally concerned with stare decisis in its
most absolute form.
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Perhaps the easiest way to define binding precedent is in opposition to
persuasive precedent.  A court may refuse to follow merely persuasive prece-
dent for any reason at all, including a simple disagreement with the prior
decision.89  By contrast, a court that confronts binding precedent may not
depart from that precedent based solely on the conclusion that the prece-
dential decision was incorrect.  This working definition is intentionally capa-
cious.  It captures the varying degrees of bindingness that a particular
decision might exert on any given court, from the weakest to the strictest
forms of obligation.
Binding precedent can operate in three dimensions: vertical, horizontal,
and diagonal.90  Vertical stare decisis refers to the notion that superior courts
create precedent that is binding on lower courts.  It typically tracks the chain
of appellate review.91  Thus, at the federal level, a judge in the District of
Massachusetts is bound by decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit, which hears appeals from the District of Massachusetts.  But a judge
in the District of Alaska, part of the Ninth Circuit, has no obligation to follow
First Circuit decisions, which are merely persuasive.92
Horizontal stare decisis refers to one court’s obligation to follow its own
precedents.  Here, the variation from jurisdiction to jurisdiction is signifi-
cantly greater.  Decisions of federal district courts, for instance, are not bind-
ing even within that district; such precedent is only persuasive.93  By contrast,
panels of any given U.S. Court of Appeals follow a rule of absolute stare deci-
sis within the circuit, such that one panel may not overrule an earlier panel
decision.94  The theory is that the panel generates the opinion of the court,
89 This definition of persuasive precedent is quite close to what Larry Alexander calls
the “natural model” of precedent in which a court gives a prior decision the weight that it
deserves. See Alexander, supra note 83, at 5.  One complication at the margin of my work-
ing definition is that even when a precedent is only persuasive, concerns about intertem-
poral equality and reliance might lead a court, which is under no formal obligation to
follow precedent, nonetheless to give the precedent at least some weight based on its mere
existence. See id. at 7.
90 The notions of vertical and horizontal stare decisis are well known in the literature.
I introduce the term “diagonal” to describe the bindingness of certain decisions across
jurisdictions.
91 See Caminker, supra note 83, at 824–25 (explaining that “a court can ignore prece-
dents established by other courts so long as they lack revisory jurisdiction over it”).
92 This is the usual way that vertical stare decisis works, but exceptions apply.  For
example, the Supreme Court of California has held that inferior courts must abide by
decisions from all Courts of Appeal, even those that do not have revisory authority over the
inferior courts. See Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, 369 P.2d 937, 940 (Cal. 1962)
(en banc).  This rule applies even though different districts and divisions of the Courts of
Appeal are not bound by one another’s decisions. See 9 WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE
§ 498 (5th ed. 2008).
93 Caminker, supra note 83, at 825.
94 See Harrison, supra note 84, at 517 (noting an “absolute rule of stare decisis”); see
also Barrett, supra note 19, at 1017–18 & n.20 (collecting cases from every circuit articulat-
ing the rule that one panel within the circuit may not overrule a prior panel decision).
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and that opinion is binding within (but not outside of) the circuit.95  Other
courts chart a course somewhere between these extremes, according substan-
tial (but not absolute) weight to their own precedents.  Examples include the
Supreme Court of the United States96 and the state Courts of Appeal in
California.97
Diagonal stare decisis involves one court’s obligation to follow precedent
from another jurisdiction, usually when applying the substantive law of that
jurisdiction.98  Perhaps the most prominent example is the Erie doctrine,
which generally compels a federal court, when sitting in diversity, to apply
state substantive law.99  In this context, the federal court’s obligation to apply
state law faithfully is exceedingly strong.100  The Supreme Court has given
states greater latitude in terms of how they apply one another’s laws, but the
obligation still exists, just in a weaker form.101
Hardly any of this is inevitable.  Several scholars have made a strong case
that the Constitution requires hierarchical precedent—vertical stare deci-
sis—with respect to lower federal courts’ duty to abide by Supreme Court
precedent.102  Moreover, diagonal stare decisis—both the Erie doctrine and
states’ duty to apply one another’s law faithfully—has roots in constitutional
imperatives.103  Otherwise, stare decisis is a highly contingent doctrine, albeit
95 See 18 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 134.02(1)(c) (3d ed.
2015).
96 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (“The doctrine of stare decisis is
essential to the respect accorded to the judgments of the Court and to the stability of the
law.  It is not, however, an inexorable command.”).
97 See 9 WITKIN, supra note 92, § 499 (“Normally, a Court of Appeal will follow prior
decisions of its own or other districts or divisions.”); cf. People v. Yeats, 136 Cal. Rptr. 243,
245 (Ct. App. 1977) (declining to follow prior panel decision).
98 See Minzner, supra note 19, at 607 (“In situations where jurisdictions are not apply-
ing their own law, flexibility is effectively eliminated.”).
99 See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996).
100 See, e.g., Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 916 (1997); 19A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET
AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4507 (3d ed. 2016).
101 See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 730–31 (1988) (holding that one court’s
misconstruction of a sister state’s law violates due process only when the misconstruction
“contradict[s] law of the other State that is clearly established and that has been brought to
the court’s attention”); see also Alan M. Trammell, Toil and Trouble: How the Erie Doctrine
Became Structurally Incoherent (and How Congress Can Fix It), 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3249,
3274–75 (2014).
102 See Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, Essay, Equity and Hierarchy: Reflections on the
Harris Execution, 102 YALE L.J. 255, 273–75 (1992) (basing this conclusion on the Constitu-
tion’s differentiation of a single Supreme Court and inferior courts); Caminker, supra note
83, at 865 (same).
103 See Trammell, supra note 101, at 3258–60 (summarizing and noting criticism of the
constitutional justifications for Erie); id. at 3275 (noting that the Supreme Court has
grounded states’ duties in the Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, and
the Due Process Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1).
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one that some scholars have defended on sound pragmatic grounds.104  But
the variations in how stare decisis operates in the United States (between
jurisdictions and at different judicial levels)105 and in different legal sys-
tems106 suggest that precedent need not bind courts or litigants as rigidly as
it does.  In fact, the complete absence of binding precedent in many Euro-
pean judicial systems has not caused them to devolve into chaos.107
Given that binding precedent need not operate exactly as it currently
does in many American jurisdictions, the question becomes whether it should
operate differently.  In other words, even if stare decisis is eminently sensible
from an institutional perspective, has it evolved into (or always been) a doc-
trine that is necessarily in tension with individual due process norms?
B. The Collapse of Traditional Distinctions
Traditionally scholars and courts have understood precedent and pre-
clusion to govern fundamentally different inquiries and to operate in signifi-
cantly different ways.  Certain salient differences continue to exist.  But the
most plausible ways to distinguish the doctrines—and the due process con-
cerns that they might raise—have largely collapsed.  First, precedent is no
longer a completely flexible tool and can often be just as binding as preclu-
sion.  Second, the distinction between fact and law can no longer justify treat-
ing preclusion and precedent so differently because both doctrines now
apply in large measure to the same types of inquiries.  Third, similar proce-
dural rules govern how and when parties and courts may invoke the
doctrines.
1. Precedent and Preclusion Often Apply With Equal (In)flexibility
The best traditional reason for viewing binding precedent as distinct
from preclusion is that the two operate with differing degrees of flexibility.
According to this argument, preclusion, when it applies, does so abso-
lutely.108  By contrast, even when precedent is binding, it supposedly retains
a degree of flexibility.109  If this is true, then preclusion is a different beast
altogether because, when applied to nonparties, it conclusively resolves the
rights and obligations of people who never had an individual opportunity to
be heard.  The supposed flexibility of binding precedent largely defuses any
104 See Caminker, supra note 83, at 867 (“The duty to obey circuit precedent generally is
dictated by the balance of salient values; the extreme rigidity of the duty, while eminently
sensible, reflects a far more controversial judgment.”).
105 See supra notes 90–101 and accompanying text.
106 See, e.g., 2 GIDEON BOAS ET AL., ELEMENTS OF CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
344–45 (2008) (describing stare decisis within the United Nations ad hoc tribunals).
107 See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 19, at 1070, 1073; Caminker, supra note 83, at 826–27.
108 See James Wm. Moore & Elizabeth B. A. Rogers, Federal Relief from Civil Judgments, 55
YALE L.J. 623, 623 (1946) (noting that preclusion “confers something approaching abso-
lute stability upon final judgments”); see also Lee, supra note 16, at 652 (similar).
109 See CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 17, at 15 (noting that, in contrast to preclusion,
“stare decisis . . . permits courts to handle precedent much more flexibly”).
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due process concerns precisely because someone who had not participated in
an earlier lawsuit can urge courts to distinguish or even overrule precedent.
The problem, as others have observed, is that precedent often applies
just as absolutely as preclusion does.110  This is most obvious with respect to
vertical stare decisis, which one scholar has called “as close to an absolutely
binding model of precedent as there is in Anglo-American law.”111  The
Supreme Court, for example, has repeatedly held that lower courts should
continue to apply precedent that directly governs the facts of a case, even
when the precedent appears discredited, and leave to the Supreme Court
“the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.”112
The same is largely true with respect to certain aspects of diagonal stare
decisis, particularly federal courts’ virtually unflagging duty to apply state sub-
stantive law in diversity cases.  Courts and commentators have long recog-
nized that the Erie doctrine nearly always forbids federal courts from
anticipatorily overruling an anomalous or antiquated decision of the state’s
highest court.113  The rare exceptions essentially prove the strength of the
overarching rule.114
A more recent development is the near absolute strength of horizontal
stare decisis within federal courts of appeals.  As noted above, those courts
now follow a rule of absolute stare decisis, such that one panel may not over-
rule an earlier panel decision.115  True, a litigant has the opportunity to seek
en banc review from the entire court of appeals, but the chances of such
review are exceedingly small—some estimates put the rate around one per-
cent—largely because courts do not regard en banc rehearing as an avenue
for mere error correction.116  The opportunity for Supreme Court review is
similarly small.  In this sense, horizontal stare decisis at the court of appeals
level is nearly as absolute as the dictates of vertical stare decisis and the Erie
doctrine.
110 See Barrett, supra note 19, at 1043–47; Minzner, supra note 19, at 606–09.
111 Barzun, supra note 83, at 1661.
112 Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989); see
also, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997) (quoting the language from
Rodriguez).
113 See, e.g., Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 916 (1997) (“Neither this Court nor any
other federal tribunal has any authority to place a construction on a state statute different
from the one rendered by the highest court of the State.”); Stern v. Cont’l Assurance Co.
(In re Ryan), 851 F.2d 502, 509 (1st Cir. 1988) (observing that a federal court may not
decline to follow an old precedent, even one from 1869, absent persuasive evidence that
the state’s highest court would overrule its decision).
114 See, e.g., Mason v. Am. Emery Wheel Works, 241 F.2d 906, 909–10 (1st Cir. 1957)
(not following Mississippi Supreme Court precedent from 1928 because that court itself
had clearly called the precedent into question).
115 See supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text.
116 See Barrett, supra note 19, at 1045–46.
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In some respects, the rigidity of binding precedent is a relatively new
development.117  Amy Coney Barrett, for example, describes the rule of abso-
lute stare decisis in the federal courts of appeals as a development of the
second half of the twentieth century.118  The Erie doctrine, of course, dates
slightly further back, to 1938.119
Although scholars have explored the rigidity of stare decisis—at least in
some of its various guises—this is only part of the story about the conver-
gence of precedent and preclusion.  Just as stare decisis can prove less flexi-
ble than its rhetoric suggests, so too preclusion can function more malleably
than its absolutist language insists.  Preclusion’s flexibility, though, typically
comes at the front end of the inquiry—that is, when deciding whether it
applies at all.120  For example, the Restatement (Second) of Judgments recognizes
an exception to issue preclusion when its application would have an “adverse
impact” on “the public interest.”121  More generally, issue preclusion should
not apply unless the party to be bound had a “full and fair” opportunity to
litigate a particular question.122  And when discussing preclusion, Charles
Clark famously noted the “judicial tenderness towards defeated litigants.”123
Thus, when a judge determines the scope of claim preclusion—the realm of
claims that a party no longer may bring because she failed to assert them in
an earlier, related lawsuit—judges often define preclusion narrowly in order
to give a party her day in court regarding the previously omitted claims.124
Similarly, in the issue preclusion context, judges sometimes define the pre-
cise “issue” that was in stake in the first litigation quite narrowly, thereby
preventing preclusion from attaching.125 The upshot of these various excep-
117 Thomas Lee concludes that “the modern muddle over stare decisis has been with us
since the founding era.”  Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Found-
ing Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REV. 647, 651 (1999).  He does conclude, how-
ever, that the absolute bindingness of vertical stare decisis was well established. See id. at
663–64.
118 See Barrett, supra note 19, at 1066 & n.214.
119 See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
120 Once preclusion applies, it typically applies absolutely.  Thus, any flexibility inheres
in deciding whether it applies in the first instance.
121 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(5)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1982).
122 See id. § 28(5)(c).
123 CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 145 (2d ed. 1947).
124 See Alan M. Trammell, Transactionalism Costs, 100 VA. L. REV. 1211, 1239–40 (2014)
(noting that in the compulsory counterclaim context, judges sometimes define the “trans-
action or occurrence” in explicitly narrow terms in order to give a party who had not
asserted a claim in a prior lawsuit the opportunity to assert that claim in a subsequent
lawsuit).
125 See, e.g., Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334, 341–45 (5th Cir. 1982)
(finding ambiguity as to whether a jury in the first lawsuit had determined that “all manu-
facturers of asbestos-containing insulation products knew or should have known of the
dangers of their particular products at all relevant times”).
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tions is a fairly capacious (if occasionally surreptitious) safety valve that allows
judges to avoid what they perceive as unfairness and injustice.126
These exceptions to preclusion’s absoluteness often bear a striking
resemblance to the factors that the Supreme Court has identified as counsel-
ing a departure from stare decisis.  For instance, the Court has said that it is
more likely to overrule an earlier precedent that has proved unworkable or
has not generated significant societal reliance.127  At a very high level of
abstraction, courts tend to embrace flexibility across the doctrines when
there are special concerns about accuracy, efficiency, and reliance.  But in
contrast to the way that the exceptions to preclusion work—as palliatives on
the front end to determine whether preclusion applies at all—the exceptions
to stare decisis typically come on the back end when a court assesses whether
certain factors militate against adhering to otherwise applicable precedent.
But when courts exercise discretion—on the front end or the back end—
seems to have very little practical effect on the fundamental flexibility or
inflexibility of the respective doctrines.
*  *  *
Although binding precedent does not operate uniformly, in many
instances it applies just as rigidly and absolutely as preclusion does.  Moreo-
ver, preclusion often admits of exceptions that function similarly to those
that mitigate stare decisis, even if those exceptions come into play at different
times during a court’s analysis.  But the overall conclusion is clear: precedent
and preclusion frequently evince the same degree of flexibility (or lack
thereof).  Consequently, the received wisdom that binding precedent is con-
stitutionally unproblematic because of its inherent flexibility does not with-
stand critical analysis.
2. The Law-Fact Distinction Has Little Explanatory Power
The other traditional basis for distinguishing between precedent and
preclusion involves the law-fact distinction, with precedent typically gov-
erning legal questions and preclusion applying to intensive factual inquiries.
Although courts and scholars have not deeply theorized that distinction as a
basis for differentiating between precedent and preclusion, two principal jus-
tifications come to mind.
First, one might believe that an individual litigant is more entitled to a
day in court—and thus that preclusion should apply only sparingly—with
regard to factual questions that are highly particularized.  The theory is that
when resolving a factual matter, as opposed to broader legal norms, an initial
party and the court might not adequately consider how that resolution will
126 See CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 17, at 130 (“In actual practice, courts apply issue
preclusion quite flexibly, invoking many exceptions in situations squarely within the rule’s
three requirements.”).
127 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576–77 (2003); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa.
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1992).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-2\NDL203.txt unknown Seq: 23  5-JAN-18 8:45
2017] precedent  and  preclusion 587
affect nonparties.  As Part III explores at greater length, many of the assump-
tions underlying this intuition are sound, but that intuition—specifically, the
importance of whether a decision-making process takes sufficient cognizance
of nonparty interests—does not turn in any meaningful way on whether a
matter is nominally factual or legal.
A second and far more practical justification stems from necessity, if not
pure logic.  In a common law system in which judicial decisions actually cre-
ate law (for example, broad swaths of contract and tort law), judicial deci-
sions, much like legislation, necessarily apply to society at large.  The notion
that judicial decisions on pure questions of law bind future litigants is axio-
matic in a common law system and, almost by definition, cannot present due
process problems.  The axiom is arguably a feature of, rather than a bug in,
the system.
The biggest problem for this argument is that, as a descriptive matter,
the law-fact distinction lacks explanatory power.  With respect to preclusion,
the Restatement (Second) of Judgments has abandoned the distinction alto-
gether,128 in significant part because many issues present mixed questions of
law and fact.  Trying to parse the difference between questions of law versus
the application of law to facts had become a difficult, arbitrary, and ulti-
mately unnecessary exercise.129
In the last generation, courts largely have embraced the Restatement’s
approach, rejecting the difference between law and fact for preclusion pur-
poses.  Among the more notable examples are two cases in which the
Supreme Court applied issue preclusion to pure questions of law. Montana v.
United States held that the U.S. government was bound by issue preclusion as
to whether a Montana tax on public contractors was constitutional.130  Simi-
larly, in United States v. Stauffer Chemical Co., the Court had no compunction
about applying issue preclusion to a question of law—whether the term
“authorized representatives,” as used in the Clean Air Act, applied to private
contractors.131  Other courts have also applied issue preclusion in the con-
text of a “pure legal question.”132  Such questions can include the existence
of personal jurisdiction over a defendant,133 the availability of certain docu-
ments under the Freedom of Information Act,134 the existence of actual
128 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (AM. LAW INST. 1982) (articulating the
requirements of issue preclusion, which may apply to any “issue of fact or law”).
129 See CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 17, at 130.
130 Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 151–53 (1979).
131 United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 464 U.S. 165, 166, 172 (1984).
132 See Nat’l Classification Comm. v. United States, 765 F.2d 164, 169 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(applying issue preclusion against the Interstate Commerce Commission on the question
whether it had exceeded its authority under two statutory provisions).
133 See Deckert v. Wachovia Student Fin. Servs., Inc., 963 F.2d 816 (5th Cir. 1992).
134 See, e.g., Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. IRS, 765 F.2d 1174, 1176–78 (D.C. Cir.
1985).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-2\NDL203.txt unknown Seq: 24  5-JAN-18 8:45
588 notre dame law review [vol. 93:2
authority to enter into contracts,135 the reviewability of agency action,136 and
the existence of probable cause under the Fourth Amendment.137
Even as courts have overwhelmingly eliminated the distinction between
law and fact in the preclusion realm, the distinction endures in one strange
way.  Courts and the Restatement have usually offered the caveat that issue
preclusion should not apply to pure questions of law unless the lawsuits that
raise those questions are substantially related.138  In Stauffer, the Court
expressed skepticism about this vestigial difference, observing that “the pur-
pose underlying the exception for ‘unmixed questions of law’ in successive
actions on unrelated claims is far from clear.”139  This exception is all the
more curious because even scholars who endorse it observe that stare decisis
can accomplish the same goal—that is, applying settled law to unrelated
claims.140
Notwithstanding this slight caveat, whether preclusion applies no longer
turns on the distinction between law and fact.  A party who has had a full and
fair opportunity to litigate a question—whether it is a factual question, a
mixed question, or even a pure legal question—may be precluded.  This
much is relatively well established.141
A less appreciated aspect of how much precedent and preclusion have
converged is the extent to which binding precedent now applies not just to
broad legal matters but also to mixed questions and intensely factual issues.
In some instances, courts are applying what looks strikingly like a version of
nonparty preclusion under the guise of precedent.  Because the courts are
binding nonparties to determinations from earlier litigation, they generally
may not rely on preclusion, lest they run afoul of extant due process con-
straints.  Instead, they achieve the same result through a surprising and
rather surreptitious use of binding precedent.  Examples from two areas of
law—the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA)
cases and sexual harassment cases—illustrate how courts have expanded pre-
cedent’s sweep.
Under RLUIPA,142 a government may not impose a “substantial burden”
on a prisoner’s religious exercise unless imposing such a burden (1) “is in
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest” and (2) “is the least
restrictive means” of pursuing that interest.143  The Supreme Court has
135 See, e.g., Soults Farms, Inc. v. Schafer, 797 N.W.2d 92, 103–06 (Iowa 2011).
136 See, e.g., Equitable Tr. Co. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 669 F.2d 269,
275 (5th Cir. 1982).
137 See, e.g., State v. Griese, No. 03-3097-CR, 2004 WL 2002492, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App.
Sept. 9, 2004).
138 See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 162 (1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 28(2) cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1982).
139 United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 464 U.S. 165, 172 (1984).
140 See CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 17, at 130, 132.
141 Barrett, supra note 19, at 1049–51; Minzner, supra note 19, at 609–10.
142 Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (2000) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000cc–2000cc-5 (2012)).
143 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a).
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emphasized that this test requires an individualized, case-by-case assess-
ment.144  But in conducting what should be an individualized analysis, courts
often circumvent that requirement by resorting to precedent that they con-
sider binding.
Consider, for example, hair length regulations in prisons.  Courts usually
find or assume that requiring inmates to cut their hair imposes a substantial
burden on religious exercise.  Accordingly, the main question under
RLUIPA is whether such regulations are the least restrictive means of pursu-
ing the government’s compelling interest in ensuring prison safety.145  In
1996, when considering a Missouri prison regulation on hair length, the
Eighth Circuit held that there was no less restrictive way to prevent contra-
band and thereby ensure safety within a maximum security facility.146  Twelve
years later, an inmate challenged a similar regulation in Arkansas.  Under
RLUIPA, the inmate was theoretically entitled to an individualized assess-
ment of whether less restrictive ways of ensuring prison safety were available,
and indeed he had adduced evidence on this point, including the fact that,
unlike the Missouri prison, the Arkansas prison was not a maximum security
facility.147  Even though these assessments are supposed to be fact inten-
sive—an inherent aspect of a least-restrictive-means analysis—the Eighth Cir-
cuit simply relied on precedent to declare that the Arkansas regulation was
valid under RLUIPA.148  Other courts have taken a similar approach with
respect to hair length regulations.149  These courts make a subtle, but some-
times explicit, move in treating a fact-intensive inquiry as a matter of law that
becomes binding through precedent.150  In other words, they seem to have
blended nonparty preclusion with binding precedent.
144 See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418,
430–31, 436 (2006); see also Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 863–64 (2015).  The Court has
also made clear that the RLUIPA test applies the same standards as those developed in the
context of the Religious Freedom Restoration Action (RFRA). See id. at 860 (discussing the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–2000bb-4 and 5 U.S.C. § 504 (2012)).
145 See James D. Nelson, Note, Incarceration, Accommodation, and Strict Scrutiny, 95 VA. L.
REV. 2053, 2080–84, 2106 (2009) (discussing different courts’ approaches to prison groom-
ing regulations).
146 Hamilton v. Schriro, 74 F.3d 1545, 1554–55 (8th Cir. 1996). Hamilton involved
RFRA, but as noted above, courts have construed the RFRA and RLUIPA standards to be
the same.
147 Fegans v. Norris, 537 F.3d 897, 909 (8th Cir. 2008) (Melloy, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
148 See id. at 903 (majority opinion) (holding that “the rationale of Hamilton thus
applies with equal force in this case” and that there was “no basis to distinguish these safety
and security concerns from those deemed sufficient in Hamilton”).
149 See, e.g., Longoria v. Dretke, 507 F.3d 898, 902–04 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam);
Gooden v. Crain, 405 F. Supp. 2d 714, 721 (E.D. Tex. 2005), aff’d in part, vacated in part,
255 F. App’x 858 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
150 See, e.g., Longoria, 507 F.3d at 904 (holding that earlier Fifth Circuit precedent on a
Texas grooming policy “provided sufficient basis for the district court to hold, as a matter of
law, that Longoria did not state a claim under RLUIPA” (first emphasis added));
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Perhaps the clearest example of this phenomenon in the RLUIPA con-
text comes from a case in which a district court treated precedent as binding
on an intensely factual matter, even though the underlying premises of the
precedent had changed significantly.  The precedential opinion by the
Eighth Circuit, Hamilton v. Schriro, found that the government’s compelling
interest in safety justified a prison’s prohibiting a Native American sweat
lodge on prison grounds.151  Even though the prison at issue in that case had
later accommodated a sweat lodge,152 a lower court treated Hamilton as appli-
cable and binding precedent.153  The lower court acknowledged what
appeared to be drastically changed circumstances—namely, that the factual
predicate of the precedential decision itself was no longer true—but none-
theless treated Hamilton as establishing, as a matter of law, that the denial of a
sweat lodge in any Missouri prison represented the least restrictive means of
ensuring prison safety.154  Again, binding precedent seems to be doing the
work of nonparty preclusion with regard to a very specific factual question.
The second context in which precedent often appears to be functioning
as preclusion traditionally had is sexual harassment law.  Under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,155 a plaintiff can state a claim for sexual harass-
ment on the theory that an employer has created a hostile work environment
by showing, among other things, that the harassment was “based on” her (or
his) sex.156  This element of a sexual harassment claim essentially turns on
whether an employer evinced sex-based animus toward an employee, which
necessarily is context and case specific.157
Atomanczyk v. Quarterman, No. 2:07-CV-0052, 2008 WL 941205, at *1–2 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 3,
2008) (holding that a Texas grooming policy was the least restrictive means of pursuing a
compelling government interest and that the plaintiff’s argument to the contrary “lacks an
arguable basis in law and is frivolous”).
151 Hamilton, 74 F.3d at 1555–56.
152 Pounders v. Kempker, 79 F. App’x 941, 943 n.2 (8th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
153 Fowler v. Crawford, No. 05-4212-CV, 2007 WL 2137803, at *6 (W.D. Mo. July 23,
2007), aff’d, 534 F.3d 931 (8th Cir. 2008).
154 See id. at *7 (“Based on the precedent of this Circuit . . . there is no dispute of
material fact that [the] restriction on a sweat lodge is supported by the state’s compelling
state interest in safety and security.”); id. at *8 (holding that “no reasonable judge could
distinguish this case from Hamilton”).
155 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (2012).
156 Generally courts recognize five elements of a prima facie case for sexual harass-
ment.  The employee must show (1) that he or she is a member of a protected class; (2)
that he or she was subject to “unwelcome” harassment; (3) that the harassment was “based
on” sex; (4) that the harassment affected “term[s], condition[s], or privilege[s]” of
employment; and (5) that there is a basis for establishing the employer’s liability. LITIGAT-
ING THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASE 5 (Matthew B. Schiff & Linda C. Kramer eds., 2d ed.
2000); see 2 SUSAN M. OMILIAN, SEX-BASED EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 22:2 (Supp.
2006); see also, e.g., Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1245 (11th Cir. 1999) (en
banc).
157 See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22–23 (1993) (noting that hostile
work environment claims are not subject to “a mathematically precise test” and that
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Notwithstanding the supposed fact specificity of sexual harassment
claims, courts frequently treat certain factual disputes as matters of law that
precedent can resolve.  Take, for example, how they handle the word “bitch.”
Some courts have held that an employer’s use of that word automatically
creates a jury question as to whether the employer has acted with animus
toward the employee “based on” her sex.  These courts have reasoned that
“bitch” is sex-specific profanity and inherently degrading.158  Some courts
have even contrasted “bitch” with other terms, like “honey” and “baby,” that
are less inherently vulgar and thus do not necessarily give rise to a jury ques-
tion regarding sex-based animus.159  In other words, even though a sexual
harassment inquiry is heavily fact dependent, these courts have effectively
declared what the term “bitch” means as a matter of law.
One might argue that the RLUIPA and sexual harassment cases are sim-
ply wrong, that courts have shirked their duty to engage in fact-sensitive
inquiries.  My objective here, though, is not to assess the legal correctness of
certain court decisions.  Instead, the cases highlight a broader descriptive
phenomenon—the law-fact distinction no longer distinguishes precedent
from preclusion.  Just as preclusion doctrine for decades has applied to all
manner of factual and legal questions, so too binding precedent has come to
govern not just legal disputes but also highly specific factual matters.
Granted, precedent has expanded more surreptitiously.  Sometimes an
observer might have a difficult time determining whether a court is resolving
factual disputes simply through analogies to earlier cases or whether a court
is treating an earlier precedent as truly binding on an intensely factual ques-
tion.  But occasionally courts do explicitly invoke the language of binding
precedent in this context.160  Even if the two doctrines do not always apply in
equal measure to every particular question, so little currently hinges on the
law-fact distinction that it cannot explain why nonparties may be bound
through stare decisis but not through preclusion.
“whether an environment is ‘hostile’ or ‘abusive’ can be determined only by looking at all
the circumstances”).
158 See, e.g., Reeves v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 525 F.3d 1139, 1144 (11th Cir.
2008) (holding that “sex specific” language, like “bitch,” “satisfies the ‘based on’ element
in a sexual harassment hostile work environment case even when the language does not
target the plaintiff”), vacated and reh’g en banc granted, 569 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2009), and
rev’d on reh’g en banc, 594 F.3d 798 (11th Cir. 2010); EEOC v. PVNF, L.L.C., 487 F.3d 790,
799 (10th Cir. 2007) (recognizing “bitch” as a sexual epithet and holding that “a jury
should decide whether these comments were made because of gender animus”); see also,
e.g., Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 304 F. App’x 707, 725 (10th Cir. 2008); Murphy v. City of
Aventura, 616 F. Supp. 2d 1267 (S.D. Fla. 2009), aff’d, 383 F. App’x 915 (11th Cir. 2010)
(per curiam); Thornton v. Flavor House Prods., Inc., No. 1:07-CV-712, 2008 WL 5328492,
at *8 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 19, 2008); Bryce v. Trace, Inc., No. CIV-06-775, 2008 WL 819494, at
*3 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 25, 2008); Turton v. Kempthorne, No. 06-cv-00451, 2007 WL 2788618,
at *6 (D. Colo. Sept. 21, 2007).
159 See Winsor v. Hinckley Dodge, Inc., 79 F.3d 996, 1000–01 (10th Cir. 1996).
160 See, e.g., supra notes 148, 151–152 and accompanying text.
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3. The Manner of Invoking the Doctrines
One of the less appreciated traditional distinctions between precedent
and preclusion is the way that a party or a court may raise an argument based
on the doctrines.  A party may invoke the force of binding precedent at
nearly any point in litigation—in a motion to dismiss, in an answer, at the
summary judgment stage, and even when requesting jury instructions.  More-
over, parties have an obligation to direct a court to binding authority.161
And if the parties have failed to cite authority that controls a case, courts may
raise the issue of binding precedent on their own.  By contrast, preclusion is
an affirmative defense in most jurisdictions.162  Accordingly, a party that fails
to raise a preclusion defense in its answer usually forfeits that defense alto-
gether.163  Moreover, a party may expressly waive a preclusion defense.164
But here, too, the traditional distinction has become much less stark.
Over the last several decades, courts have expressly relaxed their approach to
preclusion defenses.  Some courts have allowed parties to raise the defense at
stages other than in the answer to a complaint.165  Perhaps most significantly,
courts have increasingly held that a party’s failure to invoke preclusion does
not automatically forfeit the defense, in part because preclusion protects not
just individual liberty interests but also institutional interests in efficiency and
consistency.166  Accordingly, a number of courts, including the Supreme
Court, have recognized that courts may raise a preclusion defense—unlike
nearly every other affirmative defense—on their own motion.167
Differences still remain.  Even as courts largely recognize their power to
raise preclusion defenses on their own, they often note that such power is
discretionary and usually should reflect institutional concerns.168  As courts
161 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
162 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1) (listing res judicata and estoppel as affirmative
defenses).
163 See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 410 (2000) (describing “res judicata” as
“an affirmative defense ordinarily lost if not timely raised”).
164 See 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 100, § 4405; see also, e.g., Nat’l Treasury Emps.
Union v. IRS, 765 F.2d 1174, 1176 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (noting that parties may expressly
waive a preclusion defense).
165 See, e.g., Muhammad v. Oliver, 547 F.3d 874, 878 (7th Cir. 2008) (permitting a party
to invoke preclusion in a motion to dismiss); Banco Santander de P.R. v. Lopez-Stubbe (In
re Colonial Mortg. Bankers Corp.), 324 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir. 2003) (same).
166 See, e.g., Clodfelter v. Republic of Sudan, 720 F.3d 199, 209 (4th Cir. 2013) (noting
that “a concern for judicial efficiency” justified “the district court’s sua sponte considera-
tion of res judicata”); Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Bodman, 445 F.3d 438, 451 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (“[B]ecause interests of judicial economy are at stake in preclusion doctrines, courts
retain the power to consider such doctrines sua sponte.”).
167 See Arizona, 530 U.S. at 408–12 (noting that “special circumstances” can justify a
court raising a preclusion defense on its own motion); see also, e.g., Clodfelter, 720 F.3d at
207–10; Consol. Edison, 445 F.3d at 451; Mowbray v. Cameron Cty., 274 F.3d 269, 281–82
(5th Cir. 2001); Doe v. Pfrommer, 148 F.3d 73, 80 (2d Cir. 1998).
168 E.g., Scherer v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of the U.S., 347 F.3d 394, 398 n.4 (2d
Cir. 2003).
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have come to recognize that preclusion reflects both personal and institu-
tional concerns—just as precedent does—they have adopted a more capa-
cious view of when and how they can address whether preclusion should
apply.  The differences in this context, as in others, are less stark than they
once were and offer further evidence that the doctrines have converged in
terms of the circumstances under which they apply.
C. The Enduring Distinctions Between Precedent and Preclusion
At various points, I have cautioned that while precedent and preclusion
are no longer hermetically sealed categories (if they ever were), they have
not merged entirely.  Differences remain, and that is unsurprising.  Two
enduring distinctions, though, seem particularly worthy of consideration, as
they might offer the best justification for why precedent, but not preclusion,
may readily bind nonparties.
First, the doctrines, as conventionally understood, have differing geo-
graphic scopes.  Binding precedent is usually geographically confined and
follows the line of appellate review, meaning that it typically exists only within
a given jurisdiction.169  By contrast, preclusion is not so geographically con-
strained.  In fact, questions of interjurisdictional preclusion—how much
preclusive effect a judgment in one jurisdiction should exert in a sister juris-
diction—have generated sustained attention from courts and scholars in
recent decades.170  Although those questions can be quite complicated, a
very rough rule of thumb is that the court that renders a judgment also deter-
mines the preclusive consequences of that judgment.171  Consequently, a
rendering court usually dictates to other courts—both within and outside a
given jurisdiction—how much preclusion flows from the judgment.
Second, the doctrines differ in terms of lower courts’ power to bind
higher courts.  Precedent moves, so to speak, in only one direction: a supe-
rior court creates binding precedent for an inferior court but not vice
versa.172  Preclusion is different, though.  At least under certain circum-
stances, a lower court can render a decision that, through preclusion, a
higher court—even one that has appellate jurisdiction over the lower court—
may not revise.173  Consider a situation in which a lower court resolves a par-
169 See supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text.
170 See, e.g., Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001); Migra v.
Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75 (1984); Stephen B. Burbank, Interjurisdic-
tional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and Federal Common Law: A General Approach, 71 COR-
NELL L. REV. 733 (1986); Ronan E. Degnan, Federalized Res Judicata, 85 YALE L.J. 741 (1976);
Howard M. Erichson, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, 96 MICH. L. REV. 945 (1998).
171 See, e.g., Migra, 465 U.S. at 81 (“It is now settled that a federal court must give to a
state-court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment under the
law of the State in which the judgment was rendered.”); see also Degnan, supra note 170, at
773 (arguing that rendering courts should dictate the preclusive effects of their
judgments).
172 Caminker, supra note 83, at 824–25.
173 See, e.g., Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981).
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ticular question—say, a party’s liability under a contract—and the losing
party does not appeal.  In a subsequent lawsuit involving the same contract,
the losing party from the first lawsuit likely may not revisit the question of its
liability,174 even if the second lawsuit moves up the chain of appellate review.
Issue preclusion from the first lawsuit is binding, and even a superior court in
the second lawsuit must accept that question as settled.
These two enduring differences might suggest that preclusion is a more
powerful tool than precedent: a lower court can generate preclusion even if a
higher court has not reviewed the judgment, and those preclusive tentacles
have greater reach throughout all court systems in the country.  If this is true,
then perhaps one could argue that courts have sensibly cabined their power
to bind through preclusion but not precedent.
Despite these very real differences in how precedent and preclusion
operate, they ultimately cannot bear the weight of explaining why due process
severely constrains preclusion doctrine but allows stare decisis to operate
unencumbered.  First, precedent is not always geographically confined.  As
discussed above, diagonal stare decisis—when one court is applying law from
another jurisdiction—means that precedent (like preclusion) can and does
travel across jurisdictional borders.175  Second, and more importantly, most
potential concerns about preclusion that flow from the differences just
described are institutional or structural in nature.  They have almost nothing
to do with due process.
What problems might derive from the fact that an inferior court can
render a preclusion-generating (but not precedent-creating) judgment?  In
the main, the concerns are institutional—a superior court’s desire to main-
tain its supervisory power over lower courts.
Consider, for example, the question of whether issue preclusion should
apply to alternative, independently sufficient grounds of decision by a trial
court.  Some courts and the Restatement (Second) of Judgments take the position
that preclusion should not apply.176  They reason that giving preclusive effect
to alternative holdings, which an appellate court has not yet reviewed, might
unnecessarily incentivize a losing litigant to appeal all aspects of an adverse
judgment and that, in any event, a lower court might not have given suffi-
cient attention to alternative holdings.177  In other words, on this view pre-
clusion should not apply because of concerns about efficiency and accuracy.
But many courts reject this departure from the usual rule that a holding by a
174 See id. (noting that a “final, unappealed judgment on the merits” is usually entitled
to preclusive effect).
175 See supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text.
176 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. i (AM. LAW INST. 1982); see also,
e.g., In re Baylis, 217 F.3d 66, 71–72 (1st Cir. 2000) (applying Massachusetts law); Winters v.
Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 149 F.3d 387, 393–96 (5th Cir. 1998); Arab African Int’l
Bank v. Epstein, 958 F.2d 532, 535–37 (3d Cir. 1992) (applying New Jersey law).
177 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. I (AM. LAW INST. 1982).
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lower court is entitled to preclusive effect.178  Instead, they note that con-
cerns for efficiency and fairness, as in most instances, call for preclusion to
apply once a party has fully and fairly litigated a question, regardless of
whether an appellate court has reviewed the judgment.179
This disagreement—like many similar debates about preclusion’s
sweep—pertains to whether a broad or narrow rule will advance preclusion’s
underlying structural or institutional purposes (efficiency, accuracy, and the
like).  Note what the disagreement is not about: due process.  In the example
above, courts assume that an actual party has fully and fairly litigated a ques-
tion.  To bind that party through preclusion cannot violate a due process
norm precisely because the party has already enjoyed full participation rights.
Accordingly, the debate about whether to cabin preclusion concerns matters
ancillary to what due process requires.
Precedent and preclusion do differ in some of their particulars, and at
times courts implicitly recognize that the doctrines reflect different structural
or institutional goals.  But if a nonparty is to be bound through precedent or
preclusion, the individual due process concerns are almost identical.  As a
result, the enduring differences between precedent and preclusion ulti-
mately cannot explain why courts treat preclusion, but not precedent, as rais-
ing a bevy of due process difficulties.
III. THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF PRECEDENT AND PRECLUSION
In light of the tension between precedent and preclusion, the challenge
now lies in explaining why they often generate such divergent results, and
what, if anything, courts should do about the tension.
The first step in answering those questions is discerning what underlying
theories of due process motivate the two doctrines.  With respect to preclu-
sion, the day-in-court ideal that features quite prominently in the caselaw is
based on a participation-oriented theory that values individual participation
for its own sake, not simply as a means toward the end of accurate decision-
making.180  This assessment should be rather uncontroversial.  Discerning
the due process theory that underlies precedent is less straightforward.  I
argue, though, that the concept of binding precedent—even absolutely bind-
ing precedent—is fully consistent with due process, but rests on an outcome-
oriented theory that focuses on a me´lange of factors, including reliance, pre-
dictability, and (perhaps counterintuitively) accuracy.
The second step, then, is deciding which theory should hold sway.  I
suggest that the outcome-oriented theory is consonant with most facets of
civil litigation today.  By contrast, the participation-oriented theory has
become an anomaly—a costly one at that, considering that such participa-
178 See Jean Alexander Cosmetics, Inc. v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 458 F.3d 244, 251 (3d Cir.
2006) (collecting cases from the Second, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits).
179 See id. at 254.
180 See Bone, supra note 54, at 205.
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tion-oriented norms have prevented courts from realizing the full promise of
nonparty preclusion.
At the outset, one might question whether the concept of precedent—
even binding precedent—is subject to a due process analysis.  It is, after all, a
constitutive element of a common law judicial system and thus perhaps is an
axiom that requires no due process justification.
Some constitutive elements of government indeed might be impervious
to due process challenges—for example, the choice to have a bicameral legis-
lature.  Other working assumptions—for instance, state courts’ power to cre-
ate common-law crimes—might be subject to due process challenges (such as
lack of fair notice) that would have been unheard of in the eighteenth
century.
More importantly, though, the reason that most constitutive elements of
government are not subject to individual due process challenges is because
they provide a mechanism for making pure policy decisions.  If a local gov-
ernment, for example, is trying to decide whether to build a new park, there
is not really a right or a wrong answer.  The only procedural rights that apply
are in ensuring that elections and local board meetings are procedurally
proper.  But the question “Should we build a new park?” is fundamentally
different than the question “Did an employer illegally fail to pay overtime to
its employees?”  The latter is a question that is susceptible to answers based
on objective criteria under law.  Courts are engaged in a truth-seeking enter-
prise, and, therefore, the means by which they resolve these kinds of ques-
tions are subject to individual due process challenges.  Accordingly, the
mechanism by which precedent can bind litigants by resolving concrete legal
disputes requires a due process justification.
A. Two Competing Theories of Due Process
The due process theory that undergirds the current approach to preclu-
sion is fairly clear.  The Supreme Court has grounded preclusion rules in a
participation-based theory, one that regards the individualized day in court as
inherently valuable.181  Someone who was not a party to an earlier lawsuit
enjoys a strong presumption that she may revisit a matter that a court
resolved in an earlier proceeding.  Unlike in the stare decisis context,182 the
nonparty bears no special burden of proving that the earlier decision has
181 See id. (arguing that “the day in court ideal has always been tied in an essential way
to a process-oriented theory of participation”); Redish & Katt, supra note 50, at 1880 (arguing
that “the day-in-court rule springs from society’s democratic commitment to the precept of
process-based autonomy”); see also Roger H. Trangsrud, Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A
Dissent, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 69, 74 (arguing that “individual claim autonomy . . . is an
important personal right of the individual”); Roger H. Trangsrud, Joinder Alternatives in
Mass Tort Litigation, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 779, 816–20 (1985) (noting and defending the
historic tradition of individual litigant control).
182 Cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576–77 (2003) (discussing hurdles to overcome
stare decisis); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1992) (same).
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proved unworkable or even that additional process is likely to lead to a differ-
ent (much less a better) result.183
The day-in-court ideal suggests that courts do not value participation
because it leads to better results.184  Defending participation rights because
they foster better outcomes would certainly be coherent (if contestable), but
that is not how courts have conceptualized the right to participate.  Rather,
they treat participation as an inherent good, even if the precise values that
such participation fosters—whether dignity,185 equality,186 liberal democ-
racy,187 or something else—are open to debate.  In fact, the Supreme Court
has never been clear on defining those values with particularity.  But figuring
out which noninstrumental values are at stake is not critical for present pur-
poses.188  Rather, it suffices to observe that in the preclusion context, the
Supreme Court has always regarded participation as intrinsically valuable,
and that is the quintessence of a participation-based theory of due process.
The due process justification for precedent is far more enigmatic.  In
many ways, the idea that binding precedent is fully consistent with due pro-
cess has been axiomatic, largely because it has always been ingrained in, and
a defining feature of, American legal culture.189  Discerning why this is so—
and, specifically, the vision of due process that precedent vindicates—takes
some work.  The task of defending what nearly everyone regards as eminently
183 A nonparty’s presumed right to revisit a matter resolved in an earlier lawsuit—irre-
spective of potential accuracy gains—stands in contrast to the hurdles that a party must
overcome.  In the latter situation, a party can resist issue preclusion when the quality or
extensiveness of the procedures applicable to the two lawsuits is significantly different. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1982).  Critically, though, a
party has already enjoyed certain participation rights, whereas a nonparty has not.
184 See Bone, supra note 54, at 205 (arguing that the day-in-court ideal “values freedom
of strategic choice apart from its impact on outcome quality”); Redish & Katt, supra note
50, at 1889–90 (noting that process-based theories value participation “whether or not
decisionmaking accuracy is improved as a result”); see also Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural
Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 275 (2004) (arguing that “[t]he value of participation cannot
be reduced to the effect of participation on outcomes”).
185 This view is most closely associated with some of Jerry Mashaw’s seminal work. See,
e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 158–253 (1985); Jerry L.
Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U. L. REV. 885,
887–98 (1981); Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative
Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L.
REV. 28, 49–52 (1976) [hereinafter Mashaw, The Supreme Court].
186 See Jane Rutherford, The Myth of Due Process, 72 B.U. L. REV. 1, 70–74 (1992); see also
Robert S. Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes—A Plea for “Process Values,” 60
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 25 (1974) (“[R]egardless of whether fair equality of access improves
process results, the features that secure this equality are valuable.”).
187 See Redish & Katt, supra note 50, at 1892–94.
188 This question might matter in a different context—for example, when trying to
discern the precise circumstances in which a court may deviate from the day-in-court ideal.
If the values that participation promotes are not at stake in a given case, then arguably the
day-in-court ideal can operate more flexibly.
189 See CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 17, at 16 (noting that “nobody questions the
constitutionality of stare decisis”).
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defensible is not a purely academic exercise.  Either binding precedent
presents a tremendous due process problem190 or else it reveals surprising
insights into why preclusion can (and, I argue, should) function much differ-
ently than it currently does.
The first step in exploring binding precedent’s due process underpin-
nings is to recognize that precedent, as currently understood and practiced
in the United States, in many instances is simply irreconcilable with the day-
in-court ideal.  Courts and commentators do not value broad participation in
this context.  Admittedly, courts have been increasingly generous in allowing
interested parties to intervene in litigation,191 and the number of amicus fil-
ings, particularly at the Supreme Court, has been increasing rapidly over the
last several decades.192  While the opportunity to participate might be on the
rise, the binding effect of precedent has never depended on such opportuni-
ties.  More to the point, people who are interested in participating as inter-
venors or amici curiae usually do not receive any sort of formal notice that a
particular case is pending.  Consequently, even expanded opportunities to
participate do not meaningfully comport with the day-in-court ideal, which
presumptively entitles a party to notice and a right to be heard.193
Binding precedent instead most clearly reflects the values of a compet-
ing theory—an outcome-oriented theory that is consequentialist in
nature.194  In contrast to the participation-oriented theory that characterizes
current approaches to preclusion, an outcome-oriented theory is principally
concerned with the results that litigation aspires to achieve, and participation
is valuable only to the extent that it facilitates the attainment of those
results.195
What results does precedent aspire to achieve?  Traditionally, courts and
scholars have defended binding precedent based on a me´lange of considera-
190 See infra Section III.B.
191 See FED. R. CIV. P. 24; see also, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 188 F.3d 394 (6th Cir. 1999)
(finding that interested individuals and groups could intervene as a matter of right in high-
profile affirmative action lawsuits); Carl Tobias, Standing to Intervene, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 415.
192 See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on
the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 751–56 (2000); Allison Orr Larsen, The Trouble
with Amicus Facts, 100 VA. L. REV. 1757, 1758 (2014).
193 My analysis draws on the “no participation” theory that, according to Robert Bone,
best explains the historical origins of virtual representation and the idea that courts may
preclude nonparties from relitigating certain questions. See Bone, supra note 54, at 203.
194 Robert Bone refers to this as an efficiency-based theory of adjudication, and his
focus is primarily on maximizing accurate decisionmaking. See Bone, supra note 54 at
238–51.  Lawrence Solum calls this consequentialist vision of due process the Balancing
Model. See Solum, supra note 184, at 252–57.  However, an outcome-oriented theory need
not be consequentialist.  Drawing on Dworkinian theory, Bone develops a rights-based the-
ory of adjudication that is also outcome-oriented. See Bone, supra note 54, at 256–64.
195 On the instrumental value of participation, see Susan P. Sturm, The Promise of Partici-
pation, 78 IOWA L. REV. 981, 996–97 (1993) (arguing that participation can help identify
the relevant actors in a dispute, promote cooperation with the remedy that a court orders,
yield better substantive outcomes through dialogue, and educate actors responsible for
implementing a remedy).
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tions—judicial economy (because courts have to decide fewer cases from
scratch),196 the rule of law (insofar as precedent cabins judicial discretion
and thereby guards against abuses of power),197 and basic fairness (by “treat-
ing like cases alike”).198  Although these defenses usually reflect institutional
goals, they also promote individual fairness by creating uniformity, predict-
ability, and reliance.199
From a due process perspective, reliance interests are overwhelmingly
the reason that scholars have cited when justifying a rule of precedent follow-
ing even when, in a particular case, a court believes that an earlier precedent
is incorrect.200  In some situations, that reliance interest is paramount.  For
example, if a society is deciding whether its members should drive on the left
side or the right side of the road, there is not really a “correct” answer.  But it
is absolutely critical, from a reliance perspective, that people achieve clarity
on that point.  The same is probably true with respect to many legal filing
deadlines.  There is nothing magical, for instance, about the date April 15,
but people have a strong interest in knowing the date by which they must file
their federal income taxes.  These are classic situations in which—as Justice
Brandeis observed—it is far more important that the rule simply be settled
rather than settled in any particular way.201  In these cases there is no need
for additional procedures.  In fact, revisiting a settled decision will only upset
reliance without any corresponding benefits.
Reliance cannot be the full story, though, in justifying binding prece-
dent.  Accuracy still matters for due process, and only the truly rare cases
require little or no concern for accurate decisionmaking.  Without offending
any accuracy norm, a society could determine by coin flip whether its mem-
bers will drive on the left side or the right side of the road.  But in most cases,
using a coin flip to establish a precedent will be an intolerable way of laying
down the law that will apply to all future parties.
196 See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION
OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 145–49 (1991) (making the efficiency
argument for precedent); Caminker, supra note 83, at 840–43 (arguing that precedent’s
bright-line rules foster judicial economy). But see Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tra-
dition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029, 1042–43, 1047–48, 1066 (1990) (rejecting utilitarian defenses of
precedent and defending precedent based on Burkean traditionalism).
197 See, e.g., Barzun, supra note 83, at 1647 (arguing that precedent “curbs the discre-
tion of judges, thereby limiting potential abuses of power”).
198 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 113 (1978); cf. Alexander, supra note
83, at 9–13 (noting that precedent fosters “intertemporal equality” but that such a value is
weak).
199 See, e.g., SCHAUER, supra note 196, at 137–45; Barzun, supra note 83, at 1658;
Caminker, supra note 83, at 850–51; see also Schauer, Precedent, supra note 83, at 597 (not-
ing that predictability can foster autonomy).
200 See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 83, at 50–51.  Max Minzner has linked due process
and reliance interests most explicitly. See Minzner, supra note 19, at 615–21.
201 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
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If accuracy is part of an outcome-oriented defense of precedent, one
might legitimately wonder whether accuracy is usefully definable.  To my
mind, it denotes the result (or discrete group of possible results within a
decisionmaker’s discretion) that best applies preexisting rules governing peo-
ple’s rights and responsibilities to the particular situation at hand.  Put
another way, an accurate outcome best conforms to the underlying substan-
tive law.202  Others might define accuracy in terms of whether a court fash-
ions or applies rules that reflect a specific conception of justice (for example,
a rule that maximizes efficiency, social welfare, or individual dignity).  But
very little hinges on the precise definition.  One need only accept that more
and less accurate results are possible when measured against whatever metric
one chooses.
The idea that accuracy matters from a due process perspective is almost
self-evidently true with profound legal questions like, for example, whether
the Federal Constitution prohibits gender discrimination.  Almost everyone
probably intuits that resolving that question by coin flip would run afoul of
due process.  But this is true even when reliance interests are more important
than accuracy concerns.  For example, a state’s highest court might be con-
sidering whether to announce a rule of contract law that presumptively disfa-
vors contracts of adhesion.  To my mind, the reliance interests are
paramount here.  Most people’s primary concern lies simply in knowing what
the default rule is.  The content of the rule still matters, though.  Based on
whatever accuracy metric one chooses—efficiency, autonomy, etc.—one rule
is probably superior to the other, and a court should choose among the vari-
ous options through a reasoned process that is attuned to getting that choice
right.
All of this suggests that the outcome-oriented theory of due process that
best explains binding precedent is indeed focused on the results of litigation.
The desired result, though, is not simply creating reliance.  Rather, prece-
dent is consistent with due process because it strikes a reasonable balance
among a host of (sometimes) competing values.  From a due process perspec-
tive, many of those values are derivative of the institutional goals that scholars
have long identified as precedent’s hallmarks—predictability, reliance, effi-
ciency, and the like.  Perhaps surprisingly, accuracy is also within the pot-
pourri.  Though rarely discussed in this context, accuracy concerns almost
always lurk in the background and are a critical factor in explaining why one
court’s precedential decision may, without violating due process, bind people
in future cases.
Defending precedent, at least in part, on the basis of accuracy obviously
runs into the problem that stare decisis has the potential to entrench inaccu-
rate results.  If one court decides a matter incorrectly, binding precedent
exacerbates the problem by compelling other courts to replicate the inaccu-
rate result.
202 See Bone, supra note 54, at 283.
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One way to deal with this problem is essentially definitional.  Precedent,
by definition, may bind nonparties when the societal and individual interests
in reliance outweigh the interests in improved accuracy.203  Perhaps one
might be able to predict a class of cases in which reliance interests will be
particularly high—for example, many kinds of property disputes.204
The definitional approach, though, either assumes away the problem or
is question begging.  An outcome-oriented approach indeed suggests that
reliance interests can trump accuracy concerns.  How do we know whether
reliance is more important than accuracy?  According to the definitional
approach, every time a court binds nonparties through precedent, the court
has implicitly assumed that reliance is paramount.  But that proves too much.
This approach suggests that courts can disregard a due process concern for
accuracy at will, even though they have not actually considered whether reli-
ance interests are at stake.  Moreover, predicting future reliance on any given
decision in many instances is likely to be, at best, an educated guess.  And
perhaps most problematically, the definitional approach cannot explain why
nonparties are entitled to a day in court before preclusion may attach, yet
they may be bound through precedent (supposedly because of the preemi-
nence of reliance interests) regarding the exact same question.
The challenge, then, comes into sharper relief.  How is precedent consis-
tent with due process if one assumes that due process, at the very least, guar-
antees some minimal degree of procedural rights that will facilitate the
accurate resolution of cases?  Judges have a variety of tools at their disposal to
mitigate what they perceive as incorrect results.  A court can distinguish or
narrow a precedent that is arguably controlling.205  It might explicitly over-
rule its own precedent.  Or when confronting merely persuasive authority, a
court can forthrightly disagree with that precedent and decline to follow it.
None of these safety valves, though, is directly pertinent to the task at hand.
Instead, the challenge lies in defending binding precedent in its most abso-
lute form and, in particular, a court’s obligation to follow precedent that is
arguably (or even demonstrably) erroneous.206  This is the degree of near
absolute bindingness that characterizes many forms of vertical precedent, the
rule of absolute stare decisis that federal courts of appeals follow, and some
forms of diagonal stare decisis (in particular the Erie doctrine).207
With that problem squarely in focus, one might formulate the question
in a slightly different way.  Why should courts believe that a “meta-rule” of
203 See Minzner, supra note 19, at 617.
204 See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 894 (2008).
205 Richard Re differentiates the concepts of distinguishing (that is, concluding that “the
precedent, when best understood, does not actually apply” to the case at hand) and narrow-
ing (that is, interpreting a precedent as “more limited in scope than . . . the best available
reading”).  Richard M. Re, Essay, Narrowing Precedent in the Supreme Court, 114 COLUM. L.
REV. 1861, 1862–63 (2014).
206 See Alexander, supra note 83, at 4 (noting that precedent poses a problem only
when the constrained decisionmaker disagrees with the precedent).
207 See supra notes 110–15 and accompanying text.
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following precedent will, in the aggregate, generate better results even when,
in any given case, a second court might reach a better result than the initial
court did?208
Although a defense of precedent on the basis of accuracy might seem
ironic, it is actually a critical, if counterintuitive, part of the reason to believe
that precedent comports with an outcome-oriented view of due process.  The
essential logic is that, with respect to the judicial system writ large, there is no
ex ante reason to believe that one court’s resolution of an issue will be more
accurate than another court’s.209  In any particular case, of course, this might
not be true, but the question is not whether revisiting the issue in this case
might lead to a better result.  Rather, the question is whether, as a matter of
first principles, there is reason to believe that relitigating cases will lead to
better results.  To borrow Lawrence Solum’s nomenclature, precedent fosters
and prioritizes systemic accuracy rather than case accuracy.210
From an ex ante perspective, any decision is just as likely to reach a more
accurate result as any other decision.  Allowing a broad right to revisit mat-
ters that earlier courts have already decided would almost certainly lead to
greater variance in terms of the results.  But there is little ex ante reason—
again, with respect to the judicial system as a whole rather than any given
case or set of cases—to believe that a litigant who is able to achieve a different
result has achieved a more accurate result.
The argument that the first court’s resolution of a matter is just as likely
to be correct as a second court’s rests on a number of assumptions.  First, it
assumes that the law and circumstances have remained constant.  If they have
changed, then the precedent arguably does not apply any longer, such that a
court can rightly distinguish it.211  Second, the argument assumes that the
first case adequately equipped the court with the information necessary to
make as accurate a decision as possible.  In the preclusion context, for exam-
ple, a party who did not have an opportunity or incentive to litigate a ques-
tion fully and fairly will typically not be bound by the results of earlier
litigation.212  Precedent does not have such explicit requirements, but a
number of doctrines capture the same basic point indirectly.  For example,
by insisting on actual cases and controversies, as well as adversarial presenta-
208 See Alexander, supra note 83, at 49–50.
209 See Bone, supra note 54, at 240–41 (arguing a similar proposition that certain forms
of nonparty preclusion effectuate an outcome-oriented view of due process).  This analysis
relies in significant part on what Bone calls the efficiency-based argument for achieving the
greatest degree of accuracy that minimizes social costs. See id. at 238–51.
210 See Solum, supra note 184, at 247.
211 Admittedly, no two cases are ever exactly the same, and a court intent on evading
the strictures of binding precedent can point to numerous distinctions. See SCHAUER, supra
note 196, at 183–84.  But if a court makes a good faith assessment that the case before it
does not fall within the precedential rule, then the precedent simply is not applicable.
212 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(5) (AM. LAW INST. 1982); see also
Bone, supra note 54, at 240–41 (noting that the proposition that, ex ante, an initial pro-
ceeding is just as likely to generate an accurate result as would a second proceeding rests
on an assumption that the parties vigorously litigated the matter in the first proceeding).
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tion of issues,213 courts strive to ensure that they are resolving disputes based
on a comprehensive understanding of the issues involved and the future
ramifications of their decisions.  By no means do any of these doctrines guar-
antee that courts will have all of the information that they need to reach an
accurate result.  But they do offer reason to believe that any given court is in
just as good a position as any other court to resolve a matter accurately.
One obviously can raise the objection that a court that initially adopts a
precedent might reach an incorrect result and that a second court, if allowed
to revisit the matter, could correct the error and decide a case more accu-
rately.  Nor would one have to reach far to find examples when courts have
done just this.  But an appeal to the corrigibility of bad decisions omits the
flip side of the problem.  A second court, if permitted to review a matter
decided by the first court, might reach a worse result.  This could happen for
any number of reasons—less competent judges or lawyers, less motivated par-
ties, or pure happenstance.  But without a clear ex ante reason to believe that
a second proceeding has structural advantages as compared with the first,
then there is no sound reason to assume that allowing a second court to
revisit a matter will produce more accurate results.
In fact, there are good reasons to believe that a meta-rule of following
precedent will, in the aggregate, lead to more accurate decisionmaking than
a case-by-case approach.  What Barzun calls the “epistemic deference” ratio-
nale suggests that courts should follow precedent because they assume that
the previous case or cases reached the correct result,214 such that following
precedent entrenches good decisionmaking.  One version of the argument is
essentially Burkean in nature—the notion that the collective wisdom of the
past is more likely to generate better results than reasoning from abstract
principles.215  Another version essentially relies on institutional specula-
tion—the idea that higher courts, because of the quality and specialization of
the judges, are more likely than lower courts to reach better results and that
lower courts should defer to those results.216  Neither of these justifications is
fully satisfying, particularly in explaining either why courts should defer to
particularly young precedents or why binding precedent should exist outside
the realm of vertical stare decisis.  Instead, I want to suggest two reasons—
one intensely practical and one more theoretical—for believing that a rule of
following precedent will lead to more systemically accurate results.
First, at the more quotidian level, following precedent responds to the
practical limitations of the real world.  Relying on precedent likely leads to
more accurate results than would a case-by-case determination of any given
213 See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968) (noting that case-and-controversy
doctrine “limit[s] the business of federal courts to questions presented in an adversary
context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial
process”).
214 Barzun, supra note 83, at 1648.
215 See id. at 1649; see also DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 41 (2010);
Kronman, supra note 196, at 1056.
216 See Caminker, supra note 83, at 846–47.
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issue because of limited resources and the limited capacity of some deci-
sionmakers.  As Justice Cardozo observed, the judiciary would be strained to
“the breaking point if every past decision could be reopened in every
case.”217  Without precedent, a court would have to decide far more cases
from scratch and either would buckle under the burden or else would give
short shrift to every case.  By severely limiting the number of cases that any
given court must decide de novo, binding precedent channels scarce judicial
resources into the task of deciding a case as accurately as possible the first
time around and then allowing subsequent courts to trust in that judgment.
Relatedly, relying on precedent is “an application of the theory of the
second-best.”218  Precedent is a type of rule-based decisionmaking under
which judges decide cases based on a limited universe of factors.  Although
rules might prevent a truly enlightened judge from considering a broader
array of factors and reaching the most just result in any given case, rules
reduce the decisionmaking burden and thereby constrain less able judges’
power to wreak havoc.  Perhaps this is not the most edifying defense, but it
does suggest that binding precedent can avoid worst-case scenarios that
might result if less able decisionmakers were unconstrained.219
Second, from a more theoretical perspective, the creation of binding
precedent is not just a matter of looking backward at past decisions.  Instead,
“an argument from precedent looks forward as well, asking us to view today’s
decision as a precedent for tomorrow’s decisionmakers.”220  One of the
insights from the preclusion literature is that preclusion should not apply to
nonparties unless a court has taken adequate cognizance of whether and how
a decision will affect the interests of nonparties.221  This is precisely what
happens in the context of precedent, even if that understanding of prece-
dent is counterintuitive at first blush.  When a court discerns, announces,
and applies a rule of law, by definition it is not just looking backward but is
also engaged in a forward-looking enterprise.
Sometimes that act of crafting a precedent-based rule does not actually
happen during the time of the initial litigation.  The true common-law
approach to resolving cases suggests that the process of distilling a rule from
prior cases does not happen until a second (or third or fourth) lawsuit takes
place.  One particularly nice example of this is the development of the cate-
gory of “ultrahazardous” or, in modern parlance, “abnormally hazardous”
activities, which are subject to strict liability rather than negligence.222  Dur-
217 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149 (1921); see also
SCHAUER, supra note 196, at 146–47 (arguing that reliance on precedent “free[s] time,
money, and mental space for more worthwhile endeavors”).
218 SCHAUER, supra note 196, at 152.
219 See id.
220 Schauer, Precedent, supra note 83, at 572–73; see also SCHAUER, supra note 196, at 182.
221 See Bone, supra note 54, at 231 (arguing that a nonparty’s right to participate hinges
on the extent to which the remedy affects her interests and the nonparty’s extra-litigative
autonomy to control the matters at issue in the lawsuit).
222 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
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ing the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, a number of courts, in discrete
situations, held a defendant strictly liable for certain activities.  For many
decades, American courts often explicitly rejected strict liability theories and,
when they applied them, often did so in covert ways.223  Not until the early
twentieth century did courts and the American Law Institute begin to formu-
late these discrete cases as standing for a particular rule that pertained to an
entire category of cases.224
At other times, an initial court self-consciously formulates a broad rule.
Take for example the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Obergefell v.
Hodges,225 the case announcing a constitutional right to same-sex marriage.
Technically, the decision concerned only state-law prohibitions against same-
sex marriage in Michigan, Ohio, Tennessee, and Kentucky.226  Nevertheless,
the breadth of the Court’s holding was unmistakable when it declared that
“the right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the per-
son, and . . . couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right and
that liberty.”227  Even lower courts that disagreed with the decision recog-
nized that the rule from Obergefell was unambiguous.228
A precedent thus becomes a binding rule only when a particular court
understands it to be a rule, one that constrains future courts unless they can
distinguish or overrule it.  By definition, then, the formulation of the rule is
not just backward looking but also forward looking.  Unlike in other con-
texts, this process of generating a rule that will be binding even on nonpar-
ties does not necessarily have all of the formal trappings that courts usually
insist on, including adequacy of representation or the competence of the
lawyers.229  Nonetheless, the forward-looking quality of precedential rules
properly trains the judge on the future, not just the past.  For this reason,
binding precedent, unlike some determinations to which preclusion might
attach, is geared toward accurately resolving a matter that will have conse-
quences for future parties in future cases.
From an ex ante perspective, then, absolutely binding precedent is at
least as likely—and probably more likely—to produce accurate results than a
system in which courts may not rely on precedent and afford each litigant an
individual day in court.  This claim is relatively modest.  It does not insist that
precedent in its most absolute form is likely to lead to the most accurate
results.  In fact, a system that incorporates some flexibility—for example, the
223 Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, The Revitalization of Hazardous Activity Strict Lia-
bility, 65 N.C. L. REV. 257, 266 (1987).
224 Id. at 260–66.
225 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
226 See id. at 2593.
227 Id. at 2604.
228 See, e.g., Order, Ex parte State ex rel. Ala. Policy Inst., 200 So. 3d 495, 561 (Ala. Mar.
4, 2016) (per curiam); id. at 600 (Bolin, J., concurring specially) (“I do not agree with the
majority opinion in Obergefell; however, I do concede that its holding is binding authority
on this Court.”); Costanza v. Caldwell, 167 So. 3d 619 (La. 2015).
229 Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4) (adequacy of representation requirement for class repre-
sentatives); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g) (requirements for class counsel).
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Supreme Court’s power to overrule its own precedents and federal district
courts’ inability to create binding precedent—is probably superior to a sys-
tem in which a court may never revisit a precedent.  The precise calibration of
bindingness and flexibility that would lead to the most accurate results is
probably elusive.  But it is not especially critical for present purposes.  From
an outcome-oriented perspective, any system of precedent is likely to yield
more accurate results than the alternative conception, one that would allow
each person her own day in court to litigate a matter that is currently subject
to stare decisis.
B. Responding to the Tension
In light of the competing theories of due process that have contributed
to the tension between precedent and preclusion, three responses seem pos-
sible.  First, courts could level up, so to speak, by relying on the participation-
oriented theory—ensure that litigants enjoy the same presumption of an
individual day in court before they can be bound through either preclusion
or precedent.  Second, courts could try to disentangle the doctrines and
return them to their traditional spheres.  Third, courts could embrace the
outcome-oriented theory and level down—recognize that just as nonparties
do not enjoy an unfettered right to contest the binding effect of precedent,
so too they should not be entitled to a day in court before preclusion may
attach.  I briefly consider the first two approaches here and then defend the
third—leveling down—in the following Section.
The idea of leveling up more or less corresponds to an argument
advanced by then-Professor Amy Coney Barrett, whose pathbreaking article
was the first to diagnose the modern tension between precedent and preclu-
sion.  She makes a convincing case that precedent can be so absolutely bind-
ing that at times it runs afoul of the day-in-court ideal that dominates the
preclusion jurisprudence.230  But that analysis implicitly assumes that a
strong participation-based theory is the standard that should govern every
inquiry about who can be bound by the results of prior lawsuits.231  Even if
that assumption were correct (and I contend below that it is not), the conclu-
sion, as a logical matter, is too timid.
Barrett argues that binding precedent has, in some applications, lost
essential flexibility.232  She proposes that in order to save stare decisis, courts
should level up—granting more due process protections in the stare decisis
context—by restoring at least a modicum of flexibility to the doctrine.233
230 See Barrett, supra note 19, at 1038–39, 1043–47.
231 See id. at 1060–61 (arguing that stare decisis “poses the same due process problem as
the application of issue preclusion to nonparty litigants”).
232 See id. at 1043–47.
233 See id. at 1061 (arguing that courts should remove “structural barriers to error-cor-
rection,” including the federal courts of appeals’ adherence to a rule of absolute stare
decisis); id. at 1062–64 (arguing that litigants should have an opportunity to prove that
“precedent demonstrably conflicts with the statutory or constitutional provision it purports
to interpret” and should be overruled).
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But if the problem is that due process should afford every litigant her own
day in court, how is extremely strong (to say nothing of absolutely binding)
precedent consistent with that premise?  Under the current approach to pre-
clusion, a court may not bind a litigant who has not received notice of a
lawsuit or had an opportunity to be heard.  A court could not evade this
stricture by articulating a strong presumption in favor of nonparty preclu-
sion—for example, presumptively binding all future litigants, who then can
overcome the presumption only by proving that the earlier decision was
demonstrably erroneous.  Such minimal flexibility in the preclusion context
almost assuredly would run afoul of the day-in-court ideal.
If Barrett’s diagnosis is correct, then the solution should be far more
radical—the abolition of all binding precedent.  By no means would that be
catastrophic, as demonstrated by the traditions of many civil law systems that
reject the notion of binding precedent.234  But such an approach would be
out of step with American jurisprudential traditions.  If the day-in-court ideal
were the lodestar according to which courts should orient both precedent
and preclusion, then the entire concept of binding precedent would have to
fall.  The survival of binding precedent at all, even in a more circumscribed
form, suggests that precedent necessarily reflects a very different theory of
due process than the day-in-court ideal that currently animates preclusion
doctrine.  Consequently, eliminating the tension between precedent and pre-
clusion by leveling up is nearly impossible because any concept of binding
precedent is irreconcilable with giving each litigant her own day in court.
The second response to the doctrinal tension is that precedent and pre-
clusion are two fundamentally different concepts, and even if they have
become intertwined in recent years, they should return to their traditional
functions.  Precedent should govern large legal questions that apply broadly
to everyone, and preclusion should apply to fact-intensive inquiries that
affect litigants in uniquely personal ways.
The unalloyed version of this argument has a seductive elegance, but it
winds up being unhelpfully reductionist.  Although precedent and preclu-
sion sometimes became entangled surreptitiously, or even through judicial
sloppiness, there were (and remain) sound reasons for intentionally desegre-
gating the doctrines.
The Restatement (Second) of Judgments, for example, reflects the consid-
ered view of numerous courts that preclusion’s applicability should not turn
on the oft-elusive fact-law distinction.235  If a party has had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate a matter, preclusion should attach.  Whether that mat-
ter is purely legal, purely factual, or a mixed question of law and fact seems to
have little (if any) relevance to preclusion’s underlying goals.
Furthermore, from a practical perspective, figuring out whether a matter
is sufficiently “factual” to merit preclusion or sufficiently “legal” to be binding
through precedent can be a mind-bending exercise.  Suppose that we return
234 See id. at 1070, 1073; Caminker, supra note 83, at 821, 826; Frank H. Easterbrook,
Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 918–19 (1989).
235 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (AM. LAW INST. 1982).
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to a world in which precedent governs law and preclusion governs facts.  How
would this dichotomy apply to mixed questions of law and fact?  How should
a court parse whether a particular holding is a legal conclusion, a factual
conclusion, or an application of law to facts?  Perhaps we could devise good
ways to answer these questions, but the inquiries themselves do not seem
calculated to lead to fruitful results.
Perhaps most critically, returning to a dichotomous world would not
address a fundamental problem of due process that the current doctrinal
tension exposes.  If stare decisis applied only to strictly legal matters—situa-
tions in which courts are clarifying what “the law” is—why do the parties to
an initial lawsuit have the right to formulate and present arguments, yet non-
parties have no right either to participate in that lawsuit or to argue for a
different rule in a subsequent lawsuit?  In other words, even if disentangling
precedent and preclusion were possible, such an approach would do nothing
to clarify what precisely due process protects and why only some people may
fully participate in shaping precedents that have the force of law.
Max Minzner has offered a more nuanced and sophisticated version of
this second response, which seeks to differentiate precedent and preclu-
sion.236  He largely defends the status quo—the idea that precedent may
readily bind nonparties, whereas preclusion may not—by placing the doc-
trines within the framework of Mathews v. Eldridge,237 which articulates a bal-
ancing approach to determine whether due process requires a particular
procedural safeguard.238  Minzner argues that the balancing test takes cogni-
zance of public and private reliance interests.  The extent of reliance on a
previous judgment justifies why precedent and preclusion operate so differ-
ently.  Accordingly, precedent may bind nonparties when society has a strong
interest in having certain questions settled and because reliance interests out-
weigh the potential value of giving litigants the opportunity to revisit those
questions.239  By contrast, preclusion typically applies only to actual parties to
litigation because nonparties’ reliance interest is low, meaning that the judi-
cial system can afford to give those nonparties their own day in court while
not upsetting settled expectations.240  And, as Minzner points out, many of
the exceptions to the rule against nonparty preclusion (principally those
236 See Minzner, supra note 19, at 621 (arguing that stare decisis is inappropriate when
reliance interests are low and when the actual parties may challenge the binding effect of
certain judgments, including those infected with corruption).
237 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
238 Mathews essentially requires courts to balance (1) the private interest in a given
procedure, (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation without that procedure (and the likely
value that the procedure would add), and (3) the government’s interest (including an
interest in avoiding the cost of additional procedures). See id. at 335. Connecticut v. Doehr
expanded the third factor to take account of civil litigation in which the opposing party
might not be the government but nonetheless might have an interest antagonistic to the
party seeking additional procedural safeguards.  501 U.S. 1, 11 (1991).
239 See Minzner, supra note 19, at 616–17.
240 See id. at 617–18.
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exceptions concerning property rights) exist in large part because of impor-
tant reliance interests.241
Minzner’s analysis is elegant, but it is not fully satisfying.  Although reli-
ance interests are a principal justification for stare decisis, the Mathews frame-
work is quite utilitarian and actually does not explain the current approach
to preclusion, which values the individualized right to a day in court.242  An
important part of Mathews involves weighing the costs and benefits of addi-
tional process for purposes of achieving better (read: more accurate)
results.243  But the overarching rule against nonparty preclusion does not
engage in that sort of balancing.  To the contrary, as discussed earlier, the
rule values participation for its own sake, irrespective of whether more pro-
cess is likely to yield greater accuracy.  In other words, the lack of broad reli-
ance interests is not why preclusion generally applies only to parties but not
nonparties.
Moreover, from a normative perspective, formulating the scope of stare
decisis and preclusion based on how much reliance a case may or may not
generate seems fraught with difficulties.  Even if courts can identify certain
classes of cases that are likely to generate significant reliance, trying to pre-
dict the extent of reliance will probably be, at best, a rough guess.  Most prob-
lematically, it would inevitably require the resegregation of precedent and
preclusion, and, as discussed above, there are good reasons why courts
should be reluctant to treat the doctrines as hermetically sealed categories.
C. Leveling Down and Expanding Preclusion
Only one option remains for alleviating the tension between the doc-
trines and their underlying theories: leveling down.  This approach would
recognize that courts have relatively broad power to bind nonparties through
both precedent and preclusion.  Not only is it the sole remaining option, but
it usefully embraces the outcome-oriented theory of due process that best
explains binding precedent and, in fact, most approaches to procedural
design both within and outside the litigation context.  Moreover, an out-
come-oriented approach to nonparty preclusion would help solve what, until
now, have been intractable problems of serial litigation.  This Section con-
cludes by identifying some of the paradigmatic situations in which an
expanded approach to nonparty preclusion would be especially desirable
and briefly sketching how courts should address nonparty preclusion in other
contexts.
241 See id. at 619–20.
242 See Mashaw, The Supreme Court, supra note 185, at 46–57 (describing and criticizing
Mathews’s utilitarian framework); Ryan C. Williams, Due Process, Class Action Opt Outs, and
the Right Not to Sue, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 599, 616 (2015) (noting that the Mathews frame-
work is “difficult to reconcile” with the day-in-court ideal).
243 See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335; see also Doehr, 501 U.S. at 11.
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1. The Dominance of the Outcome-Oriented Theory
An outcome-oriented theory of due process already is the dominant
approach in most of civil procedure as well as in the legislative and adminis-
trative law contexts.  Accordingly, the participation-oriented approach to pre-
clusion—the day-in-court ideal—is actually anomalous.244  In most areas of
civil procedure, participation rights almost always must yield to counter-
vailing concerns for efficiency and, especially, accuracy when those values
conflict.
This subordination of participation rights is most readily apparent with
respect to lawsuit structure.245  In many instances, parties do not have com-
plete power to decide when and where they litigate certain claims.  Some-
times a plaintiff must bring another party into the lawsuit, usually when the
litigation, in that required party’s absence, would run the risk of generating
incomplete relief or inconsistent judgments.246  Similarly, litigants often must
bring certain claims once a lawsuit has commenced (or else forfeit those
claims).247  In the federal system, and the overwhelming majority of states, a
defendant must bring a counterclaim that stems from the “transaction or
occurrence” that is the subject of the plaintiff’s lawsuit.248  In that situation, a
defendant chooses neither the time nor the forum in which she must bring
her claim.  And in most jurisdictions, plaintiffs usually face a similar obliga-
tion—through claim preclusion, if not an explicit rule—to bring all transac-
tionally related claims within a single lawsuit.249  In such situations, the
plaintiff is not truly the master of his own complaint.
Although mandatory joinder rules most obviously compromise litigant
autonomy, permissive joinder rules and discretionary rules can have a simi-
lar, if somewhat more subtle, effect.  If a plaintiff chooses to join multiple
defendants together in one lawsuit, each defendant loses a degree of auton-
omy in terms of how to present her case.250  The more defendants who wind
244 See Jay Tidmarsh, Superiority as Unity, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 565, 573 (2013) (noting
that although “the Supreme Court has paid occasional homage to the ‘day in court’ ideal,”
it has “declined to read most aspects of the adversarial system into the Due Process
Clause”).
245 Much of the following discussion draws on Robert Bone’s recent arguments about
how various rules of civil procedure compromise party autonomy. See Bone, supra note 33,
at 617–24.  Given the comprehensiveness of his treatment of these issues, I sketch them
only briefly and refer the interested reader to his excellent article.
246 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a)(1).
247 See Trammell, supra note 124, at 1221–22 (describing forfeiture rules with respect to
transactionally related claims and compulsory counterclaims).
248 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a) (compulsory counterclaims); see also Trammell, supra
note 124, at 1276–78 (noting that forty states and the District of Columbia have similar
compulsory counterclaim provisions).
249 See Trammell, supra note 124, at 1270–75 (noting that at least “[t]hirty-four states
and the District of Columbia unambiguously or quite likely take a transactional approach
to claim preclusion”).
250 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a).
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up in the lawsuit, the less autonomy each enjoys.251  Likewise, a nonparty’s
decision to intervene in a lawsuit forces the original parties to share a stage
with the intervenor.252  Moreover, a judge has discretion to consolidate or
bifurcate cases for trial,253 again diminishing the parties’ power to control
the lawsuit’s structure.
In addition to the structure of lawsuits, the location of lawsuits fre-
quently reflects an outcome- (rather than participation-) oriented theory of
due process.  Although the plaintiff initially chooses the forum, various
mechanisms allow defendants and—most importantly from an outcome-ori-
ented perspective—courts to move the lawsuit away from the plaintiff’s cho-
sen forum.  For example, in the federal system, a defendant may seek to
transfer a case to another federal court when the alternative forum is more
convenient or “in the interest of justice.”254  Admittedly, the defendant bears
the burden of demonstrating that the alternative forum is superior to the
plaintiff’s initial choice.255  Critically, though, the decision whether to trans-
fer a case ultimately rests with the judge, who is supposed to base such deci-
sions on societal interests in fairness and efficiency.256  Federal judges also
have the power to concentrate related cases in a single forum.  Under the
Multidistrict Litigation statute, when cases presenting common factual ques-
tions are pending in different districts, a panel of judges may transfer those
cases to a single judge for coordinated pretrial proceedings.257  Here, too,
such decisions prioritize broader societal interests in convenience, justice,
and efficiency over any particular litigant’s preferences.258
Some of the incursions on party autonomy, at first blush, might seem
slight.  After all, even if parties in the examples above do not enjoy unfet-
tered autonomy, they are still formally involved and actually participate in
the litigation.  But a participation right has never depended solely on
whether someone is a formal party.  Instead, the right to participate—one’s
day in court—traditionally entails the power to exercise “actual control over
251 See Bone, supra note 33, at 617.
252 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a), (b) (intervention as of right and permissive
intervention).
253 See FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a), (b) (consolidation and separation).
254 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012).
255 See, e.g., Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Chimet, S.p.A., 619 F.3d 288, 295 (3d Cir. 2010);
Filmline (Cross-Country) Prods., Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 865 F.2d 513, 521 (2d Cir.
1989) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Ryan, 182 F.2d 329, 330 (2d Cir. 1950)); Momenta
Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 514, 522 (D. Mass. 2012).  Plain-
tiffs also may seek to transfer a case. See Alan M. Trammell & Derek E. Bambauer, Personal
Jurisdiction and the “Interwebs,” 100 CORNELL L. REV. 1129, 1183 (2015).  But such a move
obviously does not impinge on the plaintiff’s litigation autonomy.
256 See Trammell & Bambauer, supra note 255, at 1182; see also, e.g., Ferens v. John
Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 529 (1990) (“Section 1404(a) also exists for the benefit of the
witnesses and the interest of justice, which must include the convenience of the court.”).
257 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a).
258 See id. (authorizing MDL transfers that “will be for the convenience of parties and
witnesses and will promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions”).
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the lawsuit.”259  Thus, a diminution of someone’s control over a lawsuit, by
definition, restricts that person’s participation right, at least as the Supreme
Court has developed that concept in the preclusion context.  Accordingly,
even a relatively minor restriction on litigation autonomy demonstrates that
courts have prioritized societal interests over autonomy.  In other words,
when autonomy conflicts with accuracy, fairness, or efficiency, procedural
rules most often reflect an outcome-oriented (rather than a participation-
oriented) theory of due process.
Outside of the litigation context, the dominance of the outcome-ori-
ented approach is even more readily apparent, particularly in the legislative
arena.  As the Supreme Court has long recognized, there is no due process
right to participate in the legislative process.260  Some courts have explained
this conclusion by observing that due process rights simply do not exist in
this context.261  The better view of the law, though, is probably that the legis-
lative process itself sufficiently respects the due process rights of citizens.262
But either way, individuals do not have the right to receive actual notice, the
right to be heard, or the right to vote on any piece of legislation before it
goes into effect.
In his thoughtful argument that participation is an essential component
of procedural justice, Lawrence Solum suggests that there is a link between
participation and legislative legitimacy.  Even if citizens do not have a right to
vote directly on proposed legislation, statutes are the work of the people’s
elected representatives.  Thus, according to this argument, participation still
matters, because unless citizens have an equal right to vote, any law is illegiti-
mate.263  This is an extremely attenuated vision of participation, particularly
if applied in the judicial setting.  In some ways, the whole problem with vir-
tual representation in Taylor v. Sturgell was that someone could not be bound
by a judgment simply on the theory that his interests were adequately repre-
sented; rather, the Supreme Court insisted, direct participation and control
were necessary prerequisites for preclusion.  Moreover, in the judicial setting,
259 See, e.g., Bone, supra note 54, at 204; see also id. (noting that, in the nineteenth
century, someone was a party to litigation only to the extent that he “had a right to make
all significant litigation decisions”); Bone, supra note 33, at 616 (noting that the right to
participate has never entailed a mere “right to appear and accept whatever meager control
opportunities are available”).
260 See, e.g., Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 283–85 (1984)
(citing Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915)).
261 See, e.g., Jackson Court Condos., Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 874 F.2d 1070, 1074
(5th Cir. 1989) (first citing Bi-Metallic, 239 U.S. at 445; then citing United States v. LULAC,
793 F.2d 636, 648 (5th Cir. 1986)); Rogin v. Bensalem Twp., 616 F.2d 680, 693 (3d Cir.
1980).
262 See, e.g., Richardson v. Town of Eastover, 922 F.2d 1152, 1158 (4th Cir. 1991) (“Fair-
ness (or due process) in legislation is satisfied when legislation is enacted in accordance
with the procedures established in the state constitution and statutes for the enactment of
legislation.”); see also Hotel & Motel Ass’n of Oakland v. City of Oakland, 344 F.3d 959, 969
(9th Cir. 2003); Minzner, supra note 19, at 618–19 n.112.
263 See Solum, supra note 184, at 276–77.
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even less attenuated forms of participation (for example, intervening or fil-
ing an amicus brief) are not sufficient to satisfy the day-in-court requirement.
So, while it is true that people have a limited right to participate in choosing
their representatives, the right to vote is a far cry from the level of participa-
tion that undergirds the day-in-court ideal.
The lack of direct participation rights in the legislative arena is, in some
ways, a nod to the practical impossibility of conferring such individualized
rights upon every person affected by a law.  More importantly, though, it also
reflects a deeper theoretical point: in the legislative realm, due process
focuses on achieving a democratically legitimate outcome (as measured by
established processes), rather than ensuring a broad-based participation
right.264
A similar vision of due process is at work in the administrative law con-
text.  In the Supreme Court’s classic articulation of the point: “Where a rule
of conduct applies to more than a few people it is impracticable that every
one should have a direct voice in its adoption.”265  Thus, as with legislation,
there is simply no right to participate when an administrative agency promul-
gates generally applicable rules and regulations.  However, agency action that
uniquely affects a discrete group of people can trigger a right to notice and a
hearing.266  Even here, though, the participation right is far more circum-
scribed than it is in the adjudicatory setting, and thus primarily reflects a
concern for outcomes.  Under the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test, the type
and amount of process to which someone is entitled before an administrative
agency depends in large part on whether such participation is likely to lead
to better results.267  This is an explicitly utilitarian calculus.268  Accordingly,
it epitomizes an outcome-oriented approach to due process, insofar as it
treats participation not as inherently valuable, but only as a means to an end.
2. Expanding Nonparty Preclusion
In closing, I offer a few preliminary thoughts on the practical level if
courts were to reorient preclusion doctrine around an outcome-oriented
view of due process.  To my mind, there are two questions that courts and
scholars should keep distinct.  First, what are the outer boundaries of non-
party preclusion that due process would tolerate?  Second, within those
boundaries, how broadly should courts apply preclusion?
In answering the first question, there are probably no crisp lines
between what is constitutionally permissible and impermissible.  As noted
above, though, precedent becomes binding only when a court formulates a
264 See Bone, supra note 33, at 610–11, 611 n.150.
265 Bi-Metallic, 239 U.S. at 445.
266 See id. at 445–46 (citing Londoner v. City & Cty. of Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385
(1908)).
267 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
268 See Williams, supra note 242, at 616 (arguing that Mathews balancing is in tension
with the day-in-court ideal that dominates in the adjudicatory setting).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-2\NDL203.txt unknown Seq: 50  5-JAN-18 8:45
614 notre dame law review [vol. 93:2
rule, and that process, by definition, is forward looking in critical respects.269
On the preclusion side, resolving certain claims and issues can also be for-
ward looking, insofar as courts—even without the formal trappings of a class
action or party joinder—have adequately considered how a decision will
affect future litigants.  In those cases, expanding nonparty preclusion would
not violate constitutional due process.  Often this will probably reflect the
same concerns from the administrative law setting and the classic
Londoner–Bi-Metallic distinction.  A rule that “applies to more than a few peo-
ple”270 triggers no individual participation right, whereas a rule affecting a
“relatively small number of persons”271 requires greater respect for individ-
ual participation.  In the latter situation, due process probably forbids a
broad application of nonparty preclusion precisely because a court has not
sufficiently considered whether and how the rule will affect a wider swath of
people.
At the end of the day, the answer to the first question probably does not
matter all that much.  The line is admittedly hazy, but an outcome-oriented
view of due process is likely capacious and probably would tolerate far greater
preclusion than is wise or desirable.  The real question thus becomes how
courts (and legislatures) should expand preclusion.
At this juncture, I hesitate to suggest a comprehensive catalogue of the
types of cases in which nonparty preclusion should apply.  To my mind,
though, there are several obvious candidates, and I hope that future scholarly
dialogue will prove fruitful in exploring even more possibilities.
The clearest examples in which courts should have greater latitude to
apply nonparty preclusion are in the context of serial litigation by the real
party in interest, including many of the situations discussed earlier.272  For
example, when a parent company or its subsidiary has already litigated a mat-
ter, binding the other to the results of that litigation will often be advisable.
More importantly, when a subsequent lawsuit by the real party in interest can
effectively negate the results of earlier lawsuits, nonparty preclusion is partic-
ularly attractive and even necessary.  Such situations can include public rights
cases, including FOIA, and class certification denials.  The latter situation has
proved particularly bedeviling for judges and scholars, who have considered
various ways to deal with the problem, including through different provisions
of the Anti-Injunction Act273 and even via novel proposals that would bind
lawyers directly rather than their clients.274  Under an outcome-oriented view
of due process, though, these contortions become unnecessary.  Courts actu-
ally have the straightforward power to expand the reach of nonparty preclu-
269 See supra notes 220–24 and accompanying text.
270 Bi-Metallic, 239 U.S. at 445.
271 Id. at 445–46 (describing Londoner, 210 U.S. at 385).
272 See supra Section I.A.
273 See, e.g., Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299 (2011); In re Bridgestone/Firestone,
Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763 (7th Cir. 2003), abrogated on other grounds by
Smith, 564 U.S. 299; Wolff, supra note 7, at 2066–72.
274 See Redish & Kiernan, supra note 6, at 1662.
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sion and should do so if they are satisfied that the question of class
certification has been fully aired and vigorously litigated.  In this situation,
due process simply does not entitle every potential class member to her own
day in court, especially if the matter has already been litigated multiple times.
Under an outcome-oriented view of due process, the Supreme Court
should also reconsider one of its more controversial preclusion doctrines.  In
United States v. Mendoza, the Court held that the United States could never be
bound through offensive nonmutual issue preclusion.275  That is, if the
United States litigates a question against one person and loses, someone else
cannot use that finding against the government in a subsequent lawsuit.  This
is a departure from the usual rule that, absent countervailing considerations,
offensive nonmutual issue preclusion can be permissible.276 Mendoza rea-
soned that the United States is uniquely situated for preclusion purposes.
The government is more likely than a private party to decline to appeal every
adverse ruling, largely because of the amount of litigation that it faces as well
as its acute resource constraints.277  Moreover, broadly precluding the gov-
ernment could prevent the development of the law and eliminate circuit
splits, which the Supreme Court uses as a metric to determine which issues
are worth its attention.278
While the reasoning of Mendoza might demonstrate why the United
States should not be precluded as readily as a private party, an absolute pro-
hibition against this form of issue preclusion is problematic for two reasons.
First, administrative agencies have often used the doctrine to justify nonac-
quiescence—agencies’ refusal “to conduct their internal proceedings consist-
ently with adverse rulings of the courts of appeals.”279  Based on Mendoza,
agencies are not bound by preclusion to an adverse ruling, so—they argue—
they can disregard a federal court’s interpretation of law (at least with respect
to people who were not parties to the earlier litigation) until the Supreme
Court finally resolves the matter.280  The practice is especially controversial
with respect to intracircuit nonacquiescence—an agency’s refusal to abide by
circuit precedent even within the rendering circuit.281
275 United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 162–63 (1984).
276 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (AM. LAW INST. 1982).
277 See Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 161.
278 See id. at 160.
279 Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agen-
cies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 681 (1989).
280 See id.  Estreicher and Revesz argue, though, that if nonacquiescence is a problem,
Mendoza is not necessarily the culprit.  “As a logical matter, the fact that the government
may not be precluded in court from relitigating issues that it lost in prior cases does not
imply that it may disregard rulings of the courts of appeals in the conduct of its internal
proceedings.” Id. at 685.
281 For views critical of the practice, see, for example, Dan T. Coenen, The Constitutional
Case Against Intracircuit Nonacquiescence, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1339 (1991); Matthew Diller &
Nancy Morawetz, Intracircuit Nonacquiescence and the Breakdown of the Rule of Law: A Response
to Estreicher and Revesz, 99 YALE L.J. 801 (1990); Joshua I. Schwartz, Nonacquiescence, Crowell
v. Benson, and Administrative Adjudication, 77 GEO. L.J. 1815 (1989).
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Second, beyond facilitating the apparent lawlessness of intracircuit non-
acquiescence, the Mendoza doctrine contradicts one of the underlying prem-
ises of binding precedent elucidated above.  When there is no reason to
believe that additional litigation is likely to lead to more accurate results,
judicial economy and reliance suggest that the original decision can be bind-
ing.282  That same premise should find expression in an outcome-oriented
approach to preclusion.  Under Mendoza, though, the first decision can never
be binding in the face of the government’s objection.
Perhaps somewhat ironically, Mendoza already reflects an outcome-ori-
ented, rather than a participation-oriented, view of due process.  If participa-
tion were all that mattered, then issue preclusion could apply to the United
States, which by definition had already had its day in court in the first lawsuit.
Instead, the reasoning of Mendoza is explicitly concerned with accuracy
problems and the fear that the first decision against the government could be
wrong and nonetheless could become entrenched.283  As noted above in the
context of precedent, though, this logic neglects the converse problem—that
the first decision will be correct and that future litigation will lead to less
accurate results.284
This is all to say that from an outcome-oriented perspective, Mendoza
simply made the wrong calculation.  More litigation—even if the United
States is uniquely situated as a party—will not necessarily lead to more accu-
rate results. Mendoza stakes out a position at one extreme—insisting that for
accuracy-related reasons, offensive nonmutual issue preclusion should never
apply against the government.  The antidote is not to swing to the other
extreme and automatically apply preclusion.  (In fact, offensive nonmutual
issue preclusion never applies automatically, even to private parties.)285
In revising the Mendoza doctrine, the Supreme Court should rely on
insights about why precedent operates as it does.  Preclusion against the gov-
ernment should at least be possible when the rendering court has taken ade-
quate cognizance of the effect of its ruling in future cases—in other words,
when future litigation is not likely to lead to greater accuracy.
CONCLUSION
On a conceptual level, the convergence of binding precedent and pre-
clusion—in terms of the types of questions that they seek to answer and the
circumstances under which they govern—is intriguing in its own right.
Despite this convergence, the doctrines offer diametrically opposed answers
as to whether a nonparty may be bound by the results of earlier litigation.
That tension reveals distinct theories of due process that animate the doc-
trines.  If courts were to embrace the outcome-oriented theory that under-
282 See supra notes 209–29 and accompanying text.
283 See Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 160–62.
284 See supra notes 211–13 and accompanying text.
285 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29(1)–(8) (AM. LAW INST. 1982).
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pins precedent, they would finally have the power to resolve enduring
problems of serial litigation.
This Article has not ventured to catalogue the precise circumstances
under which nonparty preclusion should apply.  Rather, it has advanced a
theoretical argument that justifies a broader sweep for preclusion when addi-
tional lawsuits are likely to undermine the goals of reliance, repose, and accu-
racy.  In other words, the hard question is not whether nonparty prelusion is
broadly permissible.  It is.  Instead, courts and scholars should begin wres-
tling with the more salient and perhaps more difficult problem of when
courts should draw upon preclusion’s unique powers.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-2\NDL203.txt unknown Seq: 54  5-JAN-18 8:45
618 notre dame law review [vol. 93:2
